Regulating Airlines’ Safety Management System: When Proceduralization of Risks Meets Risk Owners

Deharvengt, Stéphane

doi:10.1201/9781315549774-10

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…This transition from an often very prescriptive safety approach towards an approach that is evidence-driven and based on goal-oriented legislation did not only become normative but even legally mandatory in these industries. Consequently, the establishment and maintenance of an SMS to control all risks related to a company’s operational activities became the basis for certification and regulation [ 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The introduction of SMS can also be seen as part of a regulatory strategy to place the responsibility for managing safety at the level of the organization best able to do so [ 6 , 14 ]. Rather than blindly complying with prescriptive rules and regulations, they are challenged to identify, in a structured way, what activities are critical for safety and what kind of safety management best fits their particular situation, in order to achieve acceptable levels of safety performance, [ 7 , 15 , 16 , 17 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Introducing the Extended Safety Fractal: Reusing the Concept of Safety Management Systems to Organize Resilient Organizations

Accou

Reniers

2020

IJERPH

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Although mandatory in most high-risk industries, the safety management system (SMS) is often criticized as burdensome and complex. Through its requirement to formalize all main activities, the SMS is perceived as bureaucratic and a vehicle for pure compliance and Safety I (one). Furthermore, the SMS is often detached from an organization’s core activities, goes against local practice and does not deliver the safe performance that was hoped for. By comparing the model behind SMS with specific requirements for process capability, this paper identifies a safety fractal that reflects the basic requirements that are needed to control safety related activities at all levels within an organization. It is further argued that the constituent elements of this safety fractal are particularly suitable to organize resilient performance, provided that resilience is explicitly identified as the safety strategy to follow and, as such, consequently implemented. This approach is then positioned against common safety management concepts as management system maturity, leadership and safety culture, leading to a systematic and a more comprehensive view on how to measure safety performance and resilience.

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