Regulating aircraft emissions: leadership and market power

Aviation and climate protection: EU leadership within the International Civil Aviation Organization

“…The first two negotiation strategies meet the criteria of directional leadership but were unsuccessful. However, the fact that the EU failed to convince ICAO of the ETS can only partially be explained by the EU's flawed diplomacy on the ETS (Staniland 2012(Staniland , p. 1021. Leadership is a relationship between a leader and followers -and ICAO's most powerful contract states were unwilling to follow.…”

“…The EU made ICAO aware of the problem of rising aviation and suggested the development of a global MBM to handle it (Staniland 2012(Staniland , p. 1021. Although the EU submitted ecological and economic arguments in favour of a global emissions trading scheme, ICAO rejected this idea.…”

“…Because the EU and its member states were dissatisfied with ICAO's climate protection efforts -and being aware that a common global approach was preferred by the international airline industry (Staniland 2012(Staniland , p. 1016) -the Union advanced the ETS as a global model. The EU underlined the economic benefits of its scheme and explained the exemption clause of the ETS directive, but could not persuade the ICAO contracting states to accept the ETS as a global approach.…”

“…However, the above analysis has shown that in the light of the EU's intention to address greenhouse gas emissions from the international aviation sector effectively -as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol -by means of an MBM like the ETS, its achievements are rather modest. Admittedly, it is not clear whether directional leadership based on soft power would have led to better results than the Union's futile effort to use its market power (Staniland 2012(Staniland , p. 1018 to impose the ETS on ICAO's contracting states.…”

“…its economic strength (see Wurzel et al 2012a, p. 13). For example, Oberthür and Ott (1999, p. 303, see also Staniland 2012Staniland , p. 1007 state that structural leadership is based on the political and economic resources a leader uses to put pressure onto its negotiating partners. Similarly, Underdal (1994, p. 186) regards coercive leadership as a 'sticks-and-carrots approach to affect the incentives of others to accept one's own terms or a least make a concession'.…”