2018
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.1811.02540
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Regret Circuits: Composability of Regret Minimizers

Gabriele Farina,
Christian Kroer,
Tuomas Sandholm

Abstract: Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale problems; it was recently used in breakthrough results for large-scale extensiveform game solving. This was achieved by composing simplex regret minimizers into an overall regret-minimization framework for extensiveform game strategy spaces. In this paper we study the general composability of regret minimizers. We derive a calculus for constructing regret minimizers for composite convex sets that are obtained from convexity-preserving operations on… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…All three seem to rely on the same fundamental building block of better understanding the behavior of no-regret learners whose rewards are determined by (asynchronous) observations of other no-regret learners. Some recent progress along these lines has been made [20,33], but more work is needed.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…All three seem to rely on the same fundamental building block of better understanding the behavior of no-regret learners whose rewards are determined by (asynchronous) observations of other no-regret learners. Some recent progress along these lines has been made [20,33], but more work is needed.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…CFR algorithms remain an active topic of research; recent work has shown how to combine it with function approximation [48,41,30,11,36], improve the convergence rate in certain settings [19], and apply it to more complex structures [20]. Most relevant to our work, examples are known where CFR fails to converge to the correct policy without perfect recall [35].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Extensive-form games in which players' strategy sets can depend on other players' actions have been studied by Davis, Waugh, and Bowling [19] assuming payo s are bilinear, and by Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm [27] for another speci c class of convex-concave payo s.…”
Section: Iteration Complexitymentioning
confidence: 99%