Regional Integration Through Contracting Networks

Abstract

This article advances two general hypotheses, bonding and bridging, to explain the process by which local governments decide whether to enter into contracts. The characteristics of goods and services are important factors in these decisions. In high asset-specificity transactions, the bridging hypothesis predicts local governments will establish ties with only a few “high status” actors, whereas in transactions for services with measurement difficulties, the bonding hypothesis predicts local governments will establish ties with partners of their existing partners to pool resources and reduce commitment risks. The general hypotheses are tested using agreements for law enforcement activities linking 66 actors in the Orlando-Kissimmee metropolitan area during five time periods (i.e., between 1986 and 2003). Using simulation investigation network analysis (SIENA) techniques, this study finds strong statistical support for these hypotheses.

Sources of organisational resiliency during the Thailand floods of 2011: a test of the bonding and bridging hypotheses

“…The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by examining sources of organisational resiliency and to determine specifically whether organisations in communities with closely-knitted social structures or sparsely connected linkages are likely to perceive a higher level of resiliency. Based on the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework, the study extends the argument proposed by the bonding and bridging hypotheses (Andrew, 2009;Andrew and Carr, 2013). These two hypotheses are conceptually different in their predictions about organisational resiliency.…”

“…They can gain access to a wide range of additional resources by collaborating strategically with others in the network. Moreover, the organisation can pool novel resources from various sources and hence spread the risk of organisational failures (Andrew, 2009). In this situation, one can expect emergency response functions to be spread across various levels of government, that is, local, regional, state, and national.…”

Competitors and Cooperators: A Micro‐Level Analysis of Regional Economic Development Collaboration Networks

“…Institutional arrangements play an important role in making collaboration attractive by providing specific rules about how the negotiation and bargaining process for collective outcomes should be organized, how different incidences and responsibilities should be allocated among participants, and how agreed‐upon rules will be implemented and enforced (Steinacker 2004). In this sense, regional governance can be recognized as resolving collective action problems; setting constraints that help participating governments avoid the negative effects of collective actions such as diseconomies of scale, urban sprawl, environmental impact, income disparity, and duplication of policies; enabling local governments to interact collectively to create beneficial outcomes; and reconciling rationality at the individual level with rationality at the collective level (Andrew 2009).…”

Interorganizational Collaboration Networks in Economic Development Policy: An Exponential Random Graph Model Analysis*

“…For this reason, it is generally assumed that local economic development is dominated by inefficient intergovernmental competition. What has been overlooked and underappreciated is the considerable success of targeted collaborative efforts including informal agreements and information sharing (Andrew, 2009; Feiock, Lee, Park, & Lee, 2010), intergovernmental agreements (Shrestha, 2010), creation of special districts (McCabe, 2004), and regional partnerships (Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009; Olberding, 2002). Each of these reflects instances where two or more local governments recognize their interdependency and create a desirable outcome through coordination or cooperation (Feiock & Scholz, 2010).…”