Regdata 3.0 User's Guide

McLaughlin, Patrick A.; Sherouse, Oliver; Francis, Daniel; Gasvoda, Michael; Nelson, Jonathan; Strosko, Stephen; Richards, Tyler

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3044802

Cited by 13 publications

(16 citation statements)

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“…In order to combine the agency-by-year data (i.e., lobbying and regulation data) with the patent data, I first transformed the agency-by-year data to a NAICS six-digit-by-year structure using the crosswalk provided in RegData (McLaughlin, Sherouse, Francis, Gasvoda, Nelson, Strosko & Richards 2017). Then based on the crosswalk between NAICS and CPC patent classification found in Lybbert & Zolas (2014), I matched the NAICS six-digit-by-year data to the patent data based on each patent's CPC classification and application year.…”

Section: Regdata Includes All Data On Federal Regulations In Thementioning

confidence: 99%

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Park¹

2022

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When firms engage in lobbying, their intended outcome is a regulatory change that benefits them. However, prior literature suggests that there may also be an unintended outcome of lobbying—the leakage of knowledge to competitors. In this paper, I explore when the intended and the unintended outcomes are more likely by theorizing about the relationship between lobbying and innovation. I predict that innovations that are novel are more likely to benefit from the intended regulatory changes. However, innovations that use knowledge uniquely possessed by a few firms are more likely to be compromised by the leakage of knowledge that happens during lobbying. I use new data from 1999-2013 on public U.S. firms that engaged in lobbying to federal agencies, the regulatory changes made by federal agencies, and the 16,000 patents applied for by those firms. I employ unsupervised machine learning (Doc2Vec) to measure knowledge leakage and an instrumental variable 2SLS mediation analyses to test the theory. The results suggest that the intended regulatory changes that follow lobbying can benefit innovations by facilitating wider adoption. However, unique technological knowledge that only a few firms possess may be expropriated by competitors during the process of lobbying. Overall, this paper demonstrates that fundamental aspects of innovation— such as institutional change, knowledge transfer, and technology adoption—are closely related to lobbying, a form of nonmarket activity.

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Section: Regdata Includes All Data On Federal Regulations In Thementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Regulatory change (log) RegData provides textual measures for each part of the CFR to capture changes in the regulations (McLaughlin et al 2017). In order to track the regulatory change for each industry, I focus on the number of words in the parts of the CFR linked to each industry.…”

Section: Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Park¹

2022

Preprint

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“…Although the CFR is complete in its listing of federal regulations, the original document does not list the regulations according to which federal agency is behind the particular regulation. The CFR is organized according to a set of "titles" and subcomponents of titles In order to combine the agency-by-year data (i.e., lobbying and regulation data) with the patent data, I first transformed the agency-by-year data to a NAICS six-digit-by-year structure using the crosswalk provided in RegData (McLaughlin, Sherouse, Francis, Gasvoda, Nelson, Strosko & Richards 2017). Then based on the crosswalk between NAICS and CPC patent classification found in Lybbert & Zolas (2014), I matched the NAICS six-digit-by-year data to the patent data using each patent's CPC classification and application year.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Regulatory change (log) RegData provides textual indices for each part of the CFR, which I use to measures changes in the regulations relevant for testing my theory (McLaughlin et al 2017). In order to track the regulatory changes about innovations, I focus on the CFR text from agencies that are making updates relevant to "Science and Technology" in a given year according to the FR.…”

Section: Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Caring but Sharing Unintentionally: Lobbying for Innovations and the Leakage of Knowledge

Park

2022

Proceedings

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When firms engage in lobbying, their intended outcome is a regulatory change that benefits them. However, prior literature suggests that there may also be an unintended outcome of lobbying-the leakage of knowledge to competitors. In this paper, I explore when the intended and the unintended outcomes are more likely by theorizing about the relationship between lobbying and innovation. I predict that innovations that are novel are likely to benefit from the intended regulatory changes. However, innovations that use knowledge uniquely possessed by a few firms may be compromised. I use new data from 1999-2013 on public U.S. firms that engaged in lobbying to federal agencies, the regulatory changes made by those federal agencies, and the 6,600 patents granted to the lobbying firms. I analyze the text of federal documents to measure regulatory change and patent abstracts to detect knowledge leakage. To test the theory, I conduct an instrumental variable 2SLS mediation analyses. The results suggest that the intended regulatory changes that follow lobbying can benefit innovations by reducing uncertainty and facilitating wider adoption. However, unique technological knowledge that only a few firms possess may be expropriated by competitors during the process of lobbying. Overall, this paper demonstrates that fundamental aspects of innovations-such as institutional change, knowledge transfer, and technological outcomes-are closely related to lobbying, a form of nonmarket activity.

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“…The measures assure that the wider regulatory system and the foundations of regulation are covered. Within each regulatory aspect volume and restrictiveness were measured, as was done by Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2015) and McLaughlin et al (2018). Volume is captured by counting words and regula tory restrictions identify a mandatory or prohibited activity.…”

Section: Research Question and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of regulation on private security industry dynamics

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Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be self-archived in electronic repositories. If you wish to selfarchive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com".

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Regdata 3.0 User's Guide

Cited by 13 publications

References 0 publications

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Caring but Sharing Unintentionally: Lobbying for Innovations and the Leakage of Knowledge

The impact of regulation on private security industry dynamics

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