Reformulating Urban Regime Theory: The Division of Labor between State and Market Reconsidered

Abstract

Urban regime theory has emerged as the dominant paradigm for the study of local politics. The ascendancy of regime theory has made it the subject of intense critical scrutiny. While urban scholars generally find it to be a valuable theoretical advance, many have uncovered conceptual limitations. This article develops yet another critique of urban regime theory. It argues regime theory suffersfrom an overly rigid and largely static conceptualization of the division of labor between state and market and identifies three alternative conceptualizations of this division. This exercise demonstrates the possibilities for building alternative urban regimes. It therefore suggests an enrichment of established urban regime typologies. Specifically, the article points to the existence of three previously unidentified regime types. These three urban regimes challenge the enduring tension in urban governance between a city's economic aspirations for vibrant development and its political aspirations for a vibrant democracy.

Filling in the Resource Gap of Urban Regime Analysis to Make It Travel in Time and Space

“…In the end, the general explanation about regime formation only stipulates that business actors bring economic resources and local authorities bring political resources to the governing coalition (Mossberger and Stoker 2001, p. 813). Nevertheless, as stressed by Imbroscio (1998), this view is reductive because it assumes a rigid division of labor between state and market actors. Doing so, it fails to acknowledge that municipalities also own many forms of infrastructure (e.g., airports, stadiums, mass transit systems) and can play a more active role in governing their own cites.…”

Social actors and their role in metropolitan governance in Montréal: towards an inclusive coalition?

“…We thus advance the view that Montréal's economic and governing system is the outcome of compromises involving social organizations, among them trade unions and actors involved in the social economy. 1 It is this coalition of actors, responsible for a more inclusive process than traditionally found in North America, assuring the achievement of such compromises (Barnekov and Rich 1989;Imbroscio 1998;Mossberger and Stoker 2000;Stone 1993). …”

Shaming the Inside Game

“…In fact, liberal ideology blinds expansionists from even considering the plausibility of any competing explanation. This affliction results because many of the alternative (or progressive) development strategies that might replace the corporate-centered approach question the efficiency of and seek to restructure the current division of labor between the market and the state in American corporate capitalism (see Alperovitz 2005;Clavel 1986;Rast 1999;Gunn and Gunn 1991;Garber 1990;Imbroscio 1997).…”

“…5 Yet, this division-the public-private distinction-is, from the liberal perspective, assumed to be largely immutable and fixed (i.e., structurally determined), and therefore, beyond possible reform (Imbroscio 1998; also see Davies 2002;Frug 1980). …”

“…Such activity is, in its current state of development, small-scale and largely marginal to local economies. Yet, if built upon and nurtured with effective leadership and a redirection of resources away from mainstream corporate-centered urban-development schemes, it is plausible to hypothesize that these institutions potentially could alter the structural context of city politics (i.e., reduce the intensity of the Type-I constraints) by slowing capital mobility and stabilizing the local fiscal and economic bases of cities (see Imbroscio 1999;Elkin 1987).…”