Reformulating the network theory of mental disorders: Folk psychology as a factor, not a fact

Abstract

Borsboom et al. (2019) argue that the network theory of mental disorders, if correct, blocks the biological reduction of mental disorders. This is mainly argued through a partial reformulation of network theory which combines multiple realizability of symptoms with a realist interpretation of folk psychological explanations. In this article, I argue that (a) the latter is problematic and that (b) the combination of these arguments voids the previous predictive and explanatory power of network theory. I then present a novel way in which network theory could avoid biological reductionism by considering folk psychology not as a fact, but as a structuring cause of causal connections between intentional state symptoms, together with culture and time period. Drawing from this, a novel principle for network theory is proposed, which allows it to retain force against reductionism while also retaining predictive and explanatory power.

Folk psychology and network theory: Fact or gamble? A reply to Kalis and Borsboom

“…On Haugeland’s (1993) account, it is not even clear whether the success of folk psychology would really exclude biological reduction—instead, he appears to claim that any alternative theories would simply pick out different phenomena (Haugeland, 1993, p. 65), which does not preclude their explanatory or causal relevance for psychopathology, nor safeguard that of folk psychology. This necessity to treat folk psychology as a scientific theory also shows that the problematic properties of folk psychology that I previously outlined really must be accounted for (Oude Maatman, 2020), which Kalis and Borsboom (2020) so far have not done. And finally, it shows that their realism is only making my earlier challenge to provide an “argument for the correctness of folk psychological explanations” (Oude Maatman, 2020, p. 712) more salient.…”

“…Folk psychology: A factor? Kalis and Borsboom (2020) also offer three critiques of my proposed NT (Oude Maatman, 2020). Two of these critiques appear to be grounded in differences of opinion, specifically on the need for realism about folk psychology to do "justice to [its] crucial role .…”

“…Kalis and Borsboom (2020) aim to take up my challenge (Oude Maatman, 2020) to support their folk psychology-informed network theory (NT; Borsboom et al, 2019) by providing “an argument for the correctness of folk psychological explanations, through a path that is not biological” (Kalis & Borsboom, 2020, p. 724). They do so by first confirming that they indeed interpret folk psychology realistically, and by clarifying the version of realism they adhere to as related to the accounts of Ladyman and Ross (2007) and Haugeland (1993).…”

Folk psychology as a causal language

“…This is basically the question underlying Oude Maatman’s (2020) interesting and challenging article. According to the author, our recent suggestion (Borsboom et al, 2019) that symptom networks are irreducible because they “make some sense” on the level of folk psychology “leaves NT [network theory] severely weakened” (Oude Maatman, 2020, p. 710). As Oude Maatman (2020) argues, the problem is that we seem to interpret folk psychology as a language describing reality, an interpretation that—according to Oude Maatman—threatens to make network theory “not only completely immune to falsification, but also predictively worthless” (p. 711).…”

“…According to the author, our recent suggestion (Borsboom et al, 2019) that symptom networks are irreducible because they “make some sense” on the level of folk psychology “leaves NT [network theory] severely weakened” (Oude Maatman, 2020, p. 710). As Oude Maatman (2020) argues, the problem is that we seem to interpret folk psychology as a language describing reality, an interpretation that—according to Oude Maatman—threatens to make network theory “not only completely immune to falsification, but also predictively worthless” (p. 711). In this article, we want to take up the challenge as presented by Oude Maatman: “What NT [network theory] now seems to need in order to ground itself is an argument for the correctness of folk psychological explanations, through a path that is not [emphasis added] biological” (p. 712).…”