REFORMING SOEs UNDER CHINA'S STATE CAPITALISM

Du, Julan; Wang, Yong

doi:10.1142/9789814434010_0001

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…It can also be seen that the average TFP of private enterprises is generally higher than those of SOEs and FIEs although there has been an apparent surge in the TFP of SOEs at the latter years. This is in line with the well-documented growth in profitability of SOEs as they retreat from the sectors open to competition and FDI and concentrate on highly regulated upstream industries (Du & Wang, 2013).…”

Section: Estimation Of Tfpsupporting

confidence: 80%

Agglomeration and productivity in China: Firm level evidence

Yashiro

2015

China Economic Review

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Section: Estimation Of Tfpsupporting

confidence: 80%

Agglomeration and productivity in China: Firm level evidence

Yashiro

2015

China Economic Review

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“…In China, the debt market and stock market are underdeveloped, and thus government grants are a very important source of external finance (Du & Wang, 2013). Also, as outlined above, companies that have better CER are given priority in receiving environmental grants from the government.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Incentivizing influence. In China, the debt market and stock market are under-developed, and thus government grants are a very important source of external finance (Du & Wang, 2013).…”

Section: Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the most important characteristics of the authoritarian capitalism model is that SOEs play an instrumental role in society (Du & Wang, 2013). For example, Norwegian SOEs hold 37% of the Oslo stock market, but they also control some nonlisted giants such as Statkraft, a power generator, which if listed would be the third biggest company on the stock market (“Norway: The Rich Cousin,” 2013).…”

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Influence of the Government on Corporate Environmental Reporting in China: An Authoritarian Capitalism Perspective

2018

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This study uses panel data to investigate the different roles of the Chinese government in influencing companies' decision making about corporate environmental reporting (CER) via a two-stage process. The results show that the Chinese government appears to mainly influence the decision whether to disclose or not, but has limited influence on how much firms disclose. The results also show that the traditional model of authoritarian capitalism (under which stateowned enterprises [SOEs] are the major governance arrangement) is transforming into a new model. In the new model of authoritarian capitalism, the Chinese government uses newer, more sophisticated tools to manage both state-owned and non-state-owned companies. In addition, these new governance arrangements appear to be more efficient than the traditional model. The findings of this study have implications for both the Chinese government and for Chinese companies, as well as making important contributions to the literature and knowledge of CER in China.

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“…Evidence on selection into SOEs from the period before Premier Zhu's "letting go of the small" SOE reforms in the late 1990s actually suggests the opposite: at that time the nascent private sector attracted workers who were more ambitious and risk tolerant (He et al, 2015). Since those reforms, however, SOE jobs have become much scarcer, and pay well relative to urban private sector jobs (Du and Wang, 2013). Thus it is possible that the subset of Xiamen's LH workers who are looking for private sector work on XMRC during our sample period are negatively selected (in the same way that U.S.-born workers who apply to low-wage jobs occupied mostly by temporary migrants may also be negatively selected).…”

Section: Productivity Gaps-selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Employers Prefer Migrant Workers? Evidence from a Chinese Job Board

Kühn

Shen

2015

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We study urban, private sector Chinese employers' preferences between workers with and without a local permanent residence permit (hukou) using callback information from an Internet job board. We find that these employers prefer migrant workers to locals who are identically matched to the job's requirements; these preferences are strongest in jobs requiring lower levels of education and offering low pay. While migrant-native payroll tax differentials might account for some of this gap, we argue that the patterns are hard to explain without some role for a migrant productivity advantage in less skilled jobs. Possible sources of this advantage include positive selection of nonlocals into migration, negative selection of local workers into formal search for unskilled private sector jobs, efficiency wage effects related to unskilled migrants' limited access to the urban social safety net, and intertemporal labor and effort substitution by temporary migrants that makes them more desirable workers.

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REFORMING SOEs UNDER CHINA'S STATE CAPITALISM

Cited by 12 publications

References 21 publications

Agglomeration and productivity in China: Firm level evidence

Agglomeration and productivity in China: Firm level evidence

The Influence of the Government on Corporate Environmental Reporting in China: An Authoritarian Capitalism Perspective

Do Employers Prefer Migrant Workers? Evidence from a Chinese Job Board

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