Reform Options for the EU Own Resources System

Heinemann, Friedrich; Mohl, Philipp; Osterloh, Steffen

doi:10.1007/978-3-7908-2066-9

Cited by 18 publications

(22 citation statements)

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“…Financing takes place from the pool of EU revenues which are raised from the national budgets in form of contributions. These are roughly proportional to their overall GNI and VAT revenues, so that all countries contribute according to the size of their economy (see Heinemann et al (2008) for an overview). Consequently, the economic implication at the aggregate level is similar to that of a tax on GDP, but the individual incidence additionally depends on the characteristics of the national tax system which finances the contributions to the EU.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Regional Transfers Buy Public Support? Evidence from EU Structural Policy

Osterloh

2011

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp11011.pdf Non-technical summaryThe theoretical literature suggests that upper-tier governments have an incentive to strategically allocate regional transfers in order to affect the electorate's opinion. This implies that citizens in targeted regions are aware of this intended benefit, and that they reward the benefactor for it. In this paper, the reaction of the citizens is studied, which has not found much consideration in the empirical literature until now. In particular, it focuses on the regional policy of the European Union (EU) as a special case of regional transfer policies with an immense scope and regionally targeted benefits. In this policy area the European institutions, in particular the Commission, act as benefactor and apparently also intend to increase the public support for European integration. The effects of these targeted transfers on the public support for the EU are studied by combining a rich data set on the regional allocation of structural funds payments with opinion survey data.In the empirical section, it is shown that the regional transfers show a positive impact on the public opinion that turns out to be sizeable. An increase of per capita transfers by 100 Euro increases the probability of being supportive of the EU to the extent of approximately 5 to 15%. Moreover, this is the first paper which is able to analyse the chain of causation which leads from regional transfers to public opinion in a more detailed way. In particular, the relevance of the individual's awareness of being a beneficiary is scrutinized.First, it is found that the awareness of being a beneficiary of transfers is conditional on a number of further socio-economic characteristics. Education plays an important role, since higher educated peoples' awareness reacts stronger to regional transfers than lower educated people. Second, the awareness of being supported is generally reflected in higher public support for the EU. Informed people have a 4% higher probability of having a positive opinion of the EU. However, this effect is also heterogeneous and depends on the channel of information. A sizeable effect is mainly detected for those citizens who are direct recipients of EU funds. Other information sources (TV, information signs) also have a positive but much smaller effect, whereas a negative effect is found in those cases where the respondent is acquainted with other people who...

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Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Regional Transfers Buy Public Support? Evidence from EU Structural Policy

Osterloh

2011

SSRN Journal

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“…Jetin and Denys (2005) estimate revenue in the range of USD 6-38 bn., depending on the volume elasticity. Spratt (2005) It is necessary to mention that, when considering FTT as an own resource of the EU budget, one must consider the design of the tax-based system of own resources (Heinemann, Mohl and Osterloh 2008). The possible design of an EU-tax based system of own resources was studied by Raddatz and Schick (2003).…”

Section: Ftt As An Optionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sustainability-oriented future EU funding: a financial transaction tax

2017

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“…Most national politicians refrain from expressing their support for an EU tax. Critical academic positions can be found in Caesar (2001) or Heinemann et al (2008). These opponents come to unfavourable conclusions about the impact of a tax resource on financial discipline at the EU level.…”

Section: The Revenue Side Of the Eu Budget And The Eu Tax Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

“…− Because different tax bases would imply significantly different distributional effects among member states (Heinemann et al 2008), the preference for a specific EU tax should not simply depend on the net payer/recipient profile of the current budget but in addition also on the distributional effects related to the choice of a specific tax base. This implies that equation (2) would require additional variables -proxies for the distributional consequences of a specific tax base -compared to equation (1) for a complete specification.…”

Section: Gtp = Gtp (Ind Ide Cc)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We would expect that MEPs tend to reject those tax bases which put a relative large burden on their own countries. Heinemann et al (2008) offer data on the distributional consequences for different EU tax bases which are used here. Precisely, the variable "additional burden" measures how for a certain tax base a country's contribution to the EU budget would change compared to a contribution key based on GNI shares.…”

Section: Years Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Who’s afraid of an EU tax and why?—revenue system preferences in the European Parliament

2008

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08027.pdf Non-Technical SummaryThe idea to establish some kind of EU tax as a new (and true) own resource has been widely and controversially debated as a reform option for the revenue side of the EU budget. Given these controversies we study in our contribution how the heterogeneity of preferences with regard to an EU tax can be explained among important political actors across EU countries.For that purpose our empirical study makes use of a unique data base: a survey among Members of the European Parliament which has successfully been conducted in spring 2007. Based on this outstanding database this study sheds light on the question how this diversity of views on the idea of an EU tax is understandable and, thus, contributes to a better understanding of the heterogeneous opinions which is essential for the development of realistic reform options in the coming general review on the EU budgetary system.In the theoretical part we develop testable hypotheses on the likely determinants of EU tax preferences. On the one hand, the "ideological approach" would simply suggest that a MEP's view at the idea of an EU tax is predominantly driven by her party's tax ideology, so that ideological positions related to the preferred level of European integration, the role of government or the acceptability of tax competition could be important aspects. A contrasting view, the "principal-agents approach", points at the role of national interests, which implies that EU tax preferences should be linked to nationality of a MEP rather than to party membership. Therefore, expectations on the national advantages/disadvantages, for example with respect to the distributional consequences of a specific EU tax, should be of importance. Moreover, individual characteristics of MEPs should play a role, as theory stresses that the degree of information should impact views.Our empirical results confirm an important role for ideology but they also demonstrate that both individual and country characteristics are equally important in shaping the support for an EU tax. Regarding the preference for specific tax bases for the EU tax, additional dimensions of the national interest are important. Parliamentarians from high tax countries are particularly supportive of an EU corporate tax which points to the motive of alleviating pressure from tax competition. With respect to an EU tax on financial transactions the ...

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Reform Options for the EU Own Resources System

Cited by 18 publications

References 0 publications

Can Regional Transfers Buy Public Support? Evidence from EU Structural Policy

Can Regional Transfers Buy Public Support? Evidence from EU Structural Policy

Sustainability-oriented future EU funding: a financial transaction tax

Who’s afraid of an EU tax and why?—revenue system preferences in the European Parliament

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