Reflections On Metapsychology, Theoretical Coherence, Hermeneutics, and Biology

Abstract

Unable to correlate clinical findings with contemporary neurophysiology, Freud tried to anchor psychoanalysis within biology through a speculative metapsychology. Recently, epistemological objections have led to abandonment of his proposals qua scientific theory, although many still use them metaphorically. Others deny the need for any general theory of mental functions. Some theorists would espouse a hermeneutic basis for psychoanalysis, outside the boundaries of biology; they purport to confine their purview to mental contents but often use concepts based on metapsychological assumptions. Because the meanings of such contents are difficult to determine, their interpretation should be "constructed" in collaboration with analysands. By contrast, trained observers may reliably collect psychobiological data, accumulating knowledge of cognition, affectivity, communication, and the regulation of behavior--matters Freud encompassed via the economic and structural viewpoints. Hence analytic theory should be correlated with the findings of semiotics, cognitive psychology, and brain science. The hermeneutic focus on dynamics and genetics overlooks crucial data, such as the occurrence of trauma, leading to confusion about processes of pathogenesis, working through, and structural change. These and other biological phenomena (such as functional deficits and repetitive enactments) call for interventions beyond interpreting mental contents; improvement depends on learning better to process these contents. Change implies gradual establishment of alternative neural pathways; this does not automatically follow insight. Hence psychoanalysis must deal with intrapsychic phenomena beyond subjectivity. Intrapsychic conflicts represent efforts to ward off archaic mentality (primitive thought processing). Theories divorced from neurocognitive considerations encourage the theoretical fiction that analysands possess an "intact ego."

Mind, brain, and self in psychoanalysis: Therapeutic implications of the mind-body relation.

“…These aspects of analyst behavior seem to reflect involvement of right hemisphere activity (Pally, 2001) as opposed to dominant or left-hemisphere-dependent verbal and interpretive activity. Gedo (1995Gedo ( , 1997 attempted to integrate mind and brain by advancing the notion that the process of working-through could be conceptualized in terms of effects of the therapeutic process on neurophysiological mechanisms resulting in reorganization of neural networks. 4 This would call in his view for an analytic technique beyond mere interpretation.…”

Psychoanalysis as a traditional form of knowledge: an inquiry into the methods of psychoanalysis

“…Gedo (Gedo et al, 1964;Gedo, 1997), while criticizing psychoanalysis for accepting Freud's use of neurosciences to ground his theories (and ignoring contemporary advances in biology), argues for restructuring psychoanalysis so that our theories are aligned with contemporary neurosciences. He presents examples of his ideas taking the concept of working through (Gedo, 1995).…”

Psychoanalytic treatment: A neurobiological view.

“…Even after creating psychoanalysis, he held the belief that mental phenomena are related to cerebral activity (Gedo, 1997;Reiser, 1985;Schore, 1997a).…”

“…It is also argued that neurobiological knowledge cannot contribute to the comprehension of meanings, which is the essence of psychoanalysis (Blass & Carmeli, 2007). However, according to other authors (Beutel, Stern, & Silbersweig, 2003;Cheniaux, 2006;Cooper, 1985;Gabbard, 2000;Gedo, 1997;Olds & Cooper, 1997;Ouss-Ryngaert & Golse, 2010;Reiser, 1985;Rosenblatt, 2004;Sauvagnat, Wiss, & Clement, 2010), a dialogue between psychoanalysis and neurobiology may enrich both areas. Concerning psychoanalysis, an anchoring in neurobiology may lead to greater refinement of its theories.…”