Reference: The Linguistic Essential

Savage‐Rumbaugh, E. Sue; Rumbaugh, DM; Smith, S. Tom; Lawson, Janet Lee

doi:10.1126/science.7434008

Cited by 234 publications

(94 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Some investigators have claimed that baboons (Papio anubis) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) can discriminate both natural categories (i.e., food items vs. nonfood items) and -in the apes' case -artificial categories (i.e., tools from nontools) on the basis of their functional resemblance (e.g., Bovet & Vauclair, 1998;Fabre-Thorpe, Richard, & Thorpe, 1998;Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, & Boysen, 1978;Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Smith, & Lawson, 1980). Despite their success using tools, capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) provide little evidence in transfer tests that they conceptually comprehend invariant cause-effect relations (Visalberghi & Limogelli, 1994).…”

Section: Abstract Functional Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Categorical Perception and Conceptual Judgments by Nonhuman Primates: The Paleological Monkey and the Analogical Ape

Thompson

Oden²

2000

Cognitive Science

212

166

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Studies of the conceptual abilities of nonhuman primates demonstrate the substantial range of these abilities as well as their limitations. Such abilities range from categorization on the basis of shared physical attributes, associative relations and functions to abstract concepts as reflected in analogical reasoning about relations between relations. The pattern of results from these studies point to a fundamental distinction between monkeys and apes in both their implicit and explicit conceptual capacities. Monkeys, but not apes, might be best regarded as "paleo-logicans" in the sense that they form common class concepts of identity on the basis of identical predicates (i.e., shared features). The discrimination of presumably more abstract relations commonly involves relatively simple procedural strategies mediated by associative processes likely shared by all mammals. There is no evidence that monkeys can perceive, let alone judge, relations-between-relations. This analogical conceptual capacity is found only in chimpanzees and humans. Interestingly, the "analogical ape," like the child, can make its analogical knowledge explicit only if it is first provided with a symbol system by which propositional representations can be encoded and manipulated

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Section: Abstract Functional Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Food classification by chimpanzees (Savage-Rumbaugh et al, 1980) has been explained in terms of 'mediated generalization' (Epstein, 1982;Pearce, 1997). "When a chimpanzee picks up an item of food it may react in some consistent way, such as by salivating.…”

Section: Resemblance By Relation or By Association?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Categorical Perception and Conceptual Judgments by Nonhuman Primates: The Paleological Monkey and the Analogical Ape

Thompson

Oden²

2000

Cognitive Science

212

166

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“…A functional class is a kind of associative class in which the common association is presumably an acquired function possessed by all of the members of the class (Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Smith, & Lawson, 1980). In the study by Savage-Rumbaugh and her colleagues, chimpanzees were first trained to label a set of objects (bean-cake, orange, and bread) as 'food' (edible) and a different set of objects (stick, key, and money) as 'tools' (inedible).…”

Section: Functional Classesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Concept Learning in Animals

Zentall¹,

Wasserman²,

Lazareva³

et al. 2008

CCBR

161

141

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Generally speaking, the study of concepts in cognitive psychology is anthropocentric with respect to both content and theory. A broader comparative perspective on the various forms of concept learning not only provides a more inclusive view of conceptual behavior, but it also provides a more objective perspective from which to identify underlying processes. We suggest that several of the major varieties of conceptual classes claimed to be uniquely human are also exhibited by nonhuman animals. We present evidence for the formation of several sorts of conceptual stimulus classes by nonhuman animals: perceptual classes involving classification according to the shared attributes of objects, associative classes or functional equivalences in which stimuli form a class based on common associations, relational classes, in which the conceptual relationship between or among stimuli defines the class, and relations between relations, in which the conceptual (analogical) relationship is defined by the relation between classes of stimuli. We conclude that not only are nonhuman animals capable of acquiring a wide variety of concepts, but that the underlying processes that determine concept learning are also likely to be quite similar.

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“…Savage- Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Smith, and Lawson (1980) presented language-trained chimpanzees with two sets of objects corresponding to two categories: tools and food. Subjects were trained to sort exemplars of each in separate trays and were then presented with novel exemplars of each category.…”

Section: Identifying Objectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Representing space and objects in monkeys and apes

Call¹

2000

Cognitive Science

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Primate foraging can be construed as a set of interconnected problems that include finding food, selecting efficient travel routes, anticipating the positions of moving prey, and manipulating, and occasionally, extracting food items using tools. The evidence reviewed in this paper strongly suggests that both monkeys and apes use three types of representation (i.e., static, dynamic, and relational) to solve various problems. Static representations involve recalling certain features of the environment, dynamic representations involve imagining changes in the trajectories of moving objects, and relational representations involve encoding the properties of objects in relation to other objects. Contrary to previous claims, no clear differences were found between the representational skills of monkeys and apes. Current evidence also suggests that primates may be better at representing general compared to specific problem features. Finally, we have characterized the domains of space and objects as complementary and indicated future lines of research in these domains.

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Reference: The Linguistic Essential

Cited by 234 publications

References 9 publications

Categorical Perception and Conceptual Judgments by Nonhuman Primates: The Paleological Monkey and the Analogical Ape

Categorical Perception and Conceptual Judgments by Nonhuman Primates: The Paleological Monkey and the Analogical Ape

Concept Learning in Animals

Representing space and objects in monkeys and apes

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