Reductions in emissions from deforestation from Indonesia’s moratorium on new oil palm, timber, and logging concessions

Abstract

To reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation, Indonesia instituted a nationwide moratorium on new license areas (“concessions”) for oil palm plantations, timber plantations, and logging activity on primary forests and peat lands after May 2011. Here we indirectly evaluate the effectiveness of this policy using annual nationwide data on deforestation, concession licenses, and potential agricultural revenue from the decade preceding the moratorium. We estimate that on average granting a concession for oil palm, timber, or logging in Indonesia increased site-level deforestation rates by 17–127%, 44–129%, or 3.1–11.1%, respectively, above what would have occurred otherwise. We further estimate that if Indonesia’s moratorium had been in place from 2000 to 2010, then nationwide emissions from deforestation over that decade would have been 241–615 MtCO2e (2.8–7.2%) lower without leakage, or 213–545 MtCO2e (2.5–6.4%) lower with leakage. As a benchmark, an equivalent reduction in emissions could have been achieved using a carbon price-based instrument at a carbon price of $3.30–7.50/tCO2e (mandatory) or $12.95–19.45/tCO2e (voluntary). For Indonesia to have achieved its target of reducing emissions by 26%, the geographic scope of the moratorium would have had to expand beyond new concessions (15.0% of emissions from deforestation and peat degradation) to also include existing concessions (21.1% of emissions) and address deforestation outside of concessions and protected areas (58.7% of emissions). Place-based policies, such as moratoria, may be best thought of as bridge strategies that can be implemented rapidly while the institutions necessary to enable carbon price-based instruments are developed.

Variability of fire carbon emissions in equatorial Asia and its nonlinear sensitivity to El Niño

“…The large uncertainty reflects the spread of climate model projections. Our simple method to estimate future emissions ignores exhaustion of peat stocks prone to burning and future changes in human drivers such as policies of fire management and peat conservation [van der Werf et al, 2008;Carlson et al, 2012;Busch et al, 2015]. Nevertheless, it shows the magnitude of the peat carbon deposits that are at stake under future climate change.…”

Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes

“…For linear contracts, we show how the optimal reference level should generally di¤er from the business-as-usual level, in contrast to the traditional presumption and advise (Busch et al, 2012). 15 See the review by Angelsen (2008), although the arguments therein do not include the e¤ect on the rents obtained by the districts, which is the driving force behind our results.…”

“…The model thus suggests that conservation policies will be "place-based" (for example, restricted to geographically limited but protected national parks), as seems to be the case in Indonesia, where "national and provincial governments zone areas of forest land to be logged" (Busch et al, 2015(Busch et al, , page 1328 ).…”

“…7 In Nepal, "the Forest Department was poorly sta¤ed and thus unable to implement and enforce the national policies, and deforestation increased in the 1960s and 1970s" (Shyamsundar and Ghate, 2014, pp.85). In contrast, "Deforestation in Indonesia is largely driven by the expansion of pro…table and legally sanctioned oil palm and timber plantations and logging operations" (Busch et al, 2015(Busch et al, , pp. 1328.…”

“…Regardless of this sign, conservation in one district leads to deforestation in others. Estimates of such "leakage" can be quite high, as mentioned above, and scientists have pointed out the importance of accounting for leakage when comparing various types of REDD contracts (Busch et al, 2012). 10…”