Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States

Churchland, Paul M.

doi:10.2307/2026509

Cited by 455 publications

(98 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Similarly, Churchland (1985) defines emergence in terms of the irreducibility of properties associated with a higher level theory to properties associated with components in a lower level theory. Bottomup causation and epistemological non-reductionism are the defining characteristics of most modern theories of emergence, computationalist or otherwise: in support of the former, Langton (1989) defines emergence in terms of a feedback relation between the levels in a dynamical system: local microdynamics cause global macrodynamics while global macrodynamics constrain local microdynamics; in support of the latter, Cariani (1991), who distinguishes three concepts of emergence, viz.…”

Section: Theories Of Emergencementioning

confidence: 99%

The question concerning emergence: Implications for artificiality

Ali¹,

Zimmer²,

Elstob³

1998

AIP Conference Proceedings

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This position paper has three parts. In the first part, a brief historical background and various modern formulations of the concept of emergence are presented. A number of problems associated with the concept are identified. One outstanding problem involves the incommensurability of secondary qualities (or phenomenal qualia) with materialist (externalist) ontologies. The intractability of this problem with respect to existing scientific approaches is an indicator of ontological category error, in this case, an attempt to subsume subjectivity into objectivity. In the second part, various attempts at solving the mind-body problem (of which the subjectivity-objectivity issue is a modern incarnation) are investigated and shown to be problematic. It is argued that these problems necessitate reconsidering the metaphysical foundations upon which the concept of emergence is grounded. In the third part, the notion of emergence is reconsidered and a new theory grounded in a synthesis of Heideggerian and Whiteheadian metaphysics is outlined. Finally, the implications of this synthesis for artificing (technology) are briefly considered. It is maintained that "strong" artificiality, the artifactual realization of natural phenomena such as life and mind, is impossible and that this result follows from the essence of artificing. Thus, ontology does not entail technology.

show abstract

Section: Theories Of Emergencementioning

confidence: 99%

The question concerning emergence: Implications for artificiality

Ali¹,

Zimmer²,

Elstob³

1998

AIP Conference Proceedings

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…On the other hand, let us consider the phenomenon of the free fall of a medium size body in the vicinity of the earth (henceforth, H eφ ), 9 and let us interpret the first component Y of the state space of DS e as the set of all possible values of the vertical position of an arbitrary free falling body, the second componentẎ as the set of all possible values of the vertical velocity of the falling body, 10 and the time set V of DS e as the set of all possible values of physical time. Let I He φ be such an interpretation.…”

Section: Proof Of (Iii)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Schaffner's General Reduction Paradigm (1967) was an early attempt to modify Nagel's classic account, so as to accomodate cases where the reduced theory is, strictly speaking, false. The most comprehensive and detailed deductivist account of reduction is Churchland and Hooker's Imaging Approach (Churchland 1979(Churchland , 1985Hooker 1979Hooker , 1981Hooker , 2005, which can be seen as a creative development of Nagel's basic insights, as well as a sensible departure from Nagel's explicit tenets (Beckermann 1992;Bickle 1998Bickle , 2003Marras 2002). Marras 2002 has convincingly argued that Kim's Functionalizing Approach to reduction (1998) is in fact a version of Nagel's account; such a version is essentially equivalent to the Imaging Approach.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A Representational Approach to Reduction in Dynamical Systems

Giunti

2014

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to the received view, reduction is a deductive relation between two formal theories. In this paper, I develop an alternative approach, according to which reduction is a representational relation between models, rather than a deductive relation between theories; more specifically, I maintain that this representational relation is the one of emulation. To support this thesis, I focus attention on mathematical dynamical systems and I argue that, as far as these systems are concerned, the emulation relation is sufficient for reduction. I then extend this representational view of reduction to the case of empirically interpreted dynamical systems, as well as to a treatment of partial, approximate, and asymptotic reduction.

show abstract

“…So versucht z.^B. Paul Churchland (1985) zu zeigen, dass subjektive Erlebniszustände in Wirklichkeit Hirnzustände sind, wir es aber gewohnt sind, mit mentalistischen Beschreibungen auf sie Bezug zu nehmen. Solche von der Alltagspsychologie beeinflussten Beschreibungen sind nach Churchland -verglichen mit neurophysiologischen Beschreibungen -unpräzise.…”

Section: Phänomenales Erleben Als Besonderesunclassified