Reducing the Risk of an Accidental Launch

Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia

“…35 At least some of this uncertainty may be intentional and cultivated by defense planners to complicate the adversaries' planning efforts. 36 This uncertainty is addressed implicitly in the model not only by assuming that both nations use LUA/LOW capabilities and postures but also by including model parameters representing the probability that leaders would launch a counterattack in response to attack indicators. It assumes that there is some probability that leaders would choose to ride out the apparent incoming attack and rely on second-strike capabilities, for example, instead of launching a counterattack before the use-it-or-lose-it point.…”

By accident or by design? Pushing global governance of nuclear safety

“…The very practice of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War undermined the notion of sovereignty; i.e. treaties on test bans, non-proliferation and the reduction of nuclear arsenals came to depend on transnational technical systems and institutional mechanisms of mutual surveillance and verification practices (Adler 1992;Sagan 1993;Podvig 2006). Deudney (1995, pp.…”

Global catastrophic risks

“…142 The possibility of false alarms or miscalculation between nuclear powers is another driver of risk, exacerbated further when geopolitical tensions are high. 143 There is also the unresolved question of exactly how sensitive the climate system is to dust and sulphates. The higher the sensitivity, the greater the risk of a nuclear winter scenario.…”