2016
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1606604114
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Reducing future fears by suppressing the brain mechanisms underlying episodic simulation

Abstract: Imagining future events conveys adaptive benefits, yet recurrent simulations of feared situations may help to maintain anxiety. In two studies, we tested the hypothesis that people can attenuate future fears by suppressing anticipatory simulations of dreaded events. Participants repeatedly imagined upsetting episodes that they feared might happen to them and suppressed imaginings of other such events. Suppressing imagination engaged the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which modulated activation in the hi… Show more

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Cited by 78 publications
(110 citation statements)
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“…One finding with important implications is the observation in Study 1 of substantial individual differences in the affective consequences of retrieval suppression. This observation, along with similar prior findings (Benoit, Davies, & Anderson, 2016;Gagnepain, Hulbert, & Anderson, 2017), highlights the existence of inter-individual differences in using suppression as an effective regulation and coping strategy. Thus, it would be crucial to clarify whether the large inter-individual differences observed in the inhibition of the cardiac response following memory suppression relate to differences in the neural mechanisms supporting inhibitory control.…”
Section: Results Studysupporting
confidence: 84%
“…One finding with important implications is the observation in Study 1 of substantial individual differences in the affective consequences of retrieval suppression. This observation, along with similar prior findings (Benoit, Davies, & Anderson, 2016;Gagnepain, Hulbert, & Anderson, 2017), highlights the existence of inter-individual differences in using suppression as an effective regulation and coping strategy. Thus, it would be crucial to clarify whether the large inter-individual differences observed in the inhibition of the cardiac response following memory suppression relate to differences in the neural mechanisms supporting inhibitory control.…”
Section: Results Studysupporting
confidence: 84%
“…Recent evidence indicates that administering the ESI procedure described earlier just before individuals simulate possible solutions to personally worrisome future events has beneficial effects on emotion regulation: following ESI versus a control induction, participants generated more constructive steps to address a future worrisome event, were better able to reappraise the event, and showed improvements on several measures of subjective well-being (85). However, other evidence indicates that it can also be beneficial to instead s uppress simulations of events that people fear may happen in their life (86): such suppression caused forgetting of details typically associated with the dreaded events, hindered the ability to subsequently imagine the events and, critically, also reduced apprehensiveness. People that were particularly efficient at down-regulating their fears of the future by suppression were also less trait-anxious, suggesting that suppression constitutes a natural coping mechanism.…”
Section: Functions Of Episodic Future Thinkingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To some extent, we have the ability to choose which future thoughts we keep revisiting and which we forget. This ability can be enabled through control mechanisms similar to those engaged when we recall our past memories (Benoit et al, 2016). Intentional control of past memories comprises two distinct processes: active retrieval (positive control) and active suppression (negative control), which subsequently leads to the enhancement or impairment of memory, respectively (Anderson and Green, 2001; for meta-analyses, see Anderson and Huddleston, 2012;Stramaccia et al, 2019).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%