Redistribution as a Local Public Good: An Empirical Test for Flemish Municipalities

Ashworth, John; Heyndels, Bruno; Smolders, Carine

doi:10.1111/1467-6435.00176

Cited by 32 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…10 These variables attempt to pick up the socio-economic heterogeneity of the population. For example, income diversity may weaken social pressure within the community to turn out to vote (see Cohen, 1982;Ashworth et al, 2002). 11 Finally, account is taken of the expected value of gaining office to the candidates (or parties).…”

Section: Empirical Specificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Everyone likes a winner: An empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting

2006

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Under instrumental voting closer elections are expected to have higher turnout. Under expressive voting, however, turnout may increase with decreasing closeness when voters have a preference for winners. An empirical test using data on Belgian municipal elections supports this. We find that turnout reaches a local maximum when the largest party in the election obtains just over 52% of the seats and then falls (supporting the “instrumental” closeness-argument). There is, however, another turning point: the presence of a highly dominating party (receiving at least two-thirds of the votes) stimulates turnout despite the fact that dominance implies lower closeness. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

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Section: Empirical Specificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Everyone likes a winner: An empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting

2006

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“…2 In line with the idea of maximal tolerable size of government proposed by Peacock and Wiseman (1961). 3 Even if there are some arguments in favor of local redistribution (see Pauly, 1973;Ashworth et al, 2002), the common view is that the national government should be in charge of income redistribution (see Oates, 1968 and1972;Brown and Oates, 1987;Wildasin, 1991;Epple and Romer, 1991;Feldstein and Wrobel, 1998 ). Note that in practice, most redistribution is decided at the national level.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Redistributing income under fiscal vertical imbalance

Bouton¹,

Gassner²,

Verardi³

2008

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Mini-arc fellowship. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…We therefore exclude fixed beliefs from our analysis and focus instead on the insurance and public goods motives. 6 Until 2009, unemployment benefits were essentially fully funded out of social security contributions, but since then, due to the severity of the crisis and the high unemployment rate, those contributions fund about 50% of the unemployment benefit system (TC, 2012). To make up the diffference, the central government transfers resources -funded out of general taxes.…”

Section: A Simple Model Of Redistributive Preference Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Income Redistribution a Form of Insurance, a Public Good or Both?

Backus

Moré

2014

SSRN Journal

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The IEB research program in Tax Systems' Analysis aims at promoting high quality research in the field of taxation, taking into account not only the traditional approach to optimal taxation, but also administrative issues and the decentralization or globalization context. The ultimate aim of the program is to generate socially useful knowledge in this field. Special emphasis is put on empirical research, and on the analysis of the Spanish Tax System. The program enjoys the support from the IEB-Foundation.The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is a research centre at the University of Barcelona (UB) which specializes in the field of applied economics. The IEB is a foundation funded by the following institutions: Applus, Abertis, Ajuntament de Barcelona, Diputació de Barcelona, Gas Natural and La Caixa. The IEB working papers represent ongoing research that is circulated to encourage discussion and has not undergone a peer review process. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IEB. motivates net contributors to support redistributive policies. Using instrumental variable estimation and exploiting a particularity of the Spanish labour market we estimate how workers' declared preferences for unemployment benefits spending respond to changes in the local unemployment rate. We then decompose this response into the part explained by risk aversion, and thus demand for insurance, and the part explained by the public goods nature of redistribution. Our results suggest that the declared preferences of workers for unemployment benefits spending are driven by demand for insurance rather than any public goods component. We show how these results suggest that preferences for redistribution in the form of unemployment benefits are driven by insurance considerations rather than by any public goods consideration. Documents deMAIN RESULT: Workers' demand for unemployment benefits (UB) responds positively to changes in the local unemployment rate. However, the origin of this demand is not due to workers' concern for the unemployed, but to a demand for insurance, as the relationship between the unemployment rate and demand for UB is present only for those workers who face a risk of becoming unemployed. The estimation of this self-insurance motivation is reinforced by the fact that only cyclical unemployment is relevant to cause the demand of UB.JEL Codes: D64, H53, H77

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Redistribution as a Local Public Good: An Empirical Test for Flemish Municipalities

Abstract: Pour faire une bonne dame patronnesse Mesdames tricotez tout en couleur caca d'oie Ce qui permet le dimanche à la grand-messe De reconnaître ses pauvres à soi. Jacques Brel

Cited by 32 publications

References 35 publications

Everyone likes a winner: An empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting

Everyone likes a winner: An empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting

Redistributing income under fiscal vertical imbalance

Is Income Redistribution a Form of Insurance, a Public Good or Both?

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