Redefining deterrence in cyberspace: Private sector contribution to national strategies of cyber deterrence

Lilli, Eugenio

doi:10.1080/13523260.2021.1882812

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 21 publications

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“…More research is needed to understand what malicious actors are considering with the goal of reducing their information advantage. Moving further in that direction, researchers can investigate whether to move beyond a cyber defense only posture to include cyber offense, which is promising concept but fraught with liability issues and other potential downsides, such as unintentional escalation, questionable legality, destabilization of cyberspace, and collateral damage resulting from misattribution of the perpetrator's identity (Lilli, 2021). Moving further in that direction, cyber offense, despite its potential downsides, is a promising topic.…”

Section: Gaps In Cyber Risk Identification Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber risk management: History and future research directions

McShane

Eling

Nguyen

2021

Risk Manage Insurance Review

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Cybersecurity research started in the late 1960s and has continuously evolved under different names such as computer security and information security. This article briefly covers that history but will especially focus on the latest incarnation known as "cyber risk management," which includes both technical and economic/management dimensions. The main focus of the article is to review research on individual steps of the cyber risk management process and on the overall process to highlight gaps and determine research directions. Two main findings are that cyber risk is difficult to include in the overall enterprise risk management process and that a move toward cyber resilience is necessary to deal with such a complex risk. Both findings require a level of interdisciplinary collaboration that is currently lacking.

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Section: Gaps In Cyber Risk Identification Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber risk management: History and future research directions

McShane

Eling

Nguyen

2021

Risk Manage Insurance Review

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The Dog That Did Not Bark, the Dog That Did Bark, and the Dog That Should Have Barked: A Methodology for Cyber Deterrence Research

Lupovici

2021

International Studies Review

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The study of deterrence presents a number of challenges, mainly to do with identifying deterrence success and defining how deterrence works. Studying cyber deterrence presents even greater challenges, as traditional deterrence challenges are exacerbated and interactions in the cyber domain create further difficulties. When studying cyber deterrence, scholars face uncertainty not only in identifying situations of deterrence success, but also—due to the secrecy surrounding cyber practices—in identifying situations of deterrence failure. Despite the many studies on cyber deterrence, methodological solutions to address these challenges still need to be developed. To this end, I suggest focusing on the adoption and employment of the strategy rather than on its success. I argue that since communicating threats is a core element of deterrence, it is easier to observe how the strategy is adopted and employed than whether it succeeds or fails. This focus provides a promising direction to study cyber deterrence and address these challenges.

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Deterrence through Inflicting Costs: Between Deterrence by Punishment and Deterrence by Denial

Lupovici

2023

International Studies Review

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The strategy of deterrence by denial is widely used by different actors. Despite its prominence, however, the scholarship on deterrence by denial stands to be developed further. It lags behind scholarship on deterrence by punishment on two points: in identifying the conditions under which the strategy works and in examining elements affecting its adoption. Deterrence by denial also carries some conceptual ambiguity since its employment takes many significantly different forms and also because it overlaps with deterrence by punishment. Despite the emphasis in current scholarship on “inflicting costs” as a defining element of deterrence by punishment, costs arguably also play a significant role in deterrence by denial. To address these challenges, I distinguish between deterrence strategies by focusing on two main elements: the means the deterrer actor threatens to use (offensive or non-offensive) and the timing of the threatened use of these means (before or after the unwanted activity). This offers a more nuanced distinction between deterrence strategies and better encompasses the role of inflicting costs in deterrence by denial. I suggest that this research offers a useful point of departure to further theorize about deterrence by denial, and it sets a promising research agenda that is pertinent given the growing interest in deterrence by denial, especially in its application to cyber deterrence.

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Redefining deterrence in cyberspace: Private sector contribution to national strategies of cyber deterrence

Cited by 5 publications

References 21 publications

Cyber risk management: History and future research directions

Cyber risk management: History and future research directions

The Dog That Did Not Bark, the Dog That Did Bark, and the Dog That Should Have Barked: A Methodology for Cyber Deterrence Research

Deterrence through Inflicting Costs: Between Deterrence by Punishment and Deterrence by Denial

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