1992
DOI: 10.1177/009539979202400302
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Red Tape and Task Delays in Public and Private Organizations

Abstract: Using a measure of red tape based on the amount of time required for the performance of core organizational tasks, hypotheses are tested as to why some organizations have more red tape than others. Among the explanations considered are organizational size, sector, "publicness" defined in terms of governmental interaction and influence independent of sector, and external constraint defined in terms of interorganizational agreements and percentage of time devoted to external activities. The data for the study co… Show more

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Cited by 130 publications
(101 citation statements)
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“…Even when they disagree, there is probably more certainty among agents about principals' preferences in the private sector than in the public sector, where tasks are less well-defined and where there is a mix of often incommensurate goals (e.g., effectiveness, responsiveness, equity, and accountability) (Heimann, 1994). However, many private firms are directly affected by political decisions, especially if they are regulated by government (e.g., telecommunications; electric power), or if the government is a primary client (defense, aerospace, and many private corporations in industries like computers and software that supply items to the government) (Bozeman, 1992). Thus, when political principals are important and attentive, disagreement among those relatively distant principals who have vague and mutually inconsistent preferences is likely to reduce discretion among employees, no matter whether they work in the private or in the public sector.…”
Section: Monitoring Uncertainty Risk and Other Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Even when they disagree, there is probably more certainty among agents about principals' preferences in the private sector than in the public sector, where tasks are less well-defined and where there is a mix of often incommensurate goals (e.g., effectiveness, responsiveness, equity, and accountability) (Heimann, 1994). However, many private firms are directly affected by political decisions, especially if they are regulated by government (e.g., telecommunications; electric power), or if the government is a primary client (defense, aerospace, and many private corporations in industries like computers and software that supply items to the government) (Bozeman, 1992). Thus, when political principals are important and attentive, disagreement among those relatively distant principals who have vague and mutually inconsistent preferences is likely to reduce discretion among employees, no matter whether they work in the private or in the public sector.…”
Section: Monitoring Uncertainty Risk and Other Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, when political principals are important and attentive, disagreement among those relatively distant principals who have vague and mutually inconsistent preferences is likely to reduce discretion among employees, no matter whether they work in the private or in the public sector. Political control may matter more than the sector (Bozeman, 1992(Bozeman, , 1987.…”
Section: Monitoring Uncertainty Risk and Other Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Also, the ES software needed to be modified in half the organizations, which means higher investments needed to be made and implementation became more complicated. Also, very few organizations reported changes in organizational structure to support the ES, also the availability and retention of skilled staff was problematic, both possibly inhibited by red tape (see Bozeman, Reed, & Scott, 1992) or other public sector constraints. It is therefore important for public sector organizations to negotiate increased attention on government specific needs for ES (Kumar, Maheshwari, & Kumar, 2002).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Однако проблема бюрократического давления, по-видимому, обладает значительной устойчивостью к рациональным стратегиям и нравственным пропо-ведям. Никто не выступает за сохранение бюрократи-ческого давления; и хотя ряд чиновников прибегают к нему, чтобы отвратить просителей и сэкономить деньги, мало кто делает это осознанно 163 . Как показано выше, истинными причинами бюрократического дав-ления являются глубоко укоренившиеся структурные факторы: различия в статусе, отношения с незнако-мыми людьми, институциональные недостатки и ди-вергентные стимулы 164 .…”
Section: администрирование ориентированное на кли-ента: управленчunclassified
“…Если вы от-кроете сборник должностных инструкций (обычно очень объемистый) или руководство для чиновника государственного учреждения 76 , то вряд ли вы най-дете там утверждение, что то или иное требование 75 Ведется обширная дискуссия по поводу того, больше ли распространена волокита в государственных учреждениях, чем в частных организациях эквивалентной величины и сложности. См., например, [163] (показано, что именно государственный ха-рактер организации лучше всего объясняет распространенность в ней волокиты); [164] (показано, что волокита распространена в некоммерческих частных больницах); [165] (показано, что во-локита распространена в государственных учреждениях больше, чем в подобных частных некоммерческих организациях). 76 Это один из аспектов, показывающих, что управление выходит за рамки правовой модели.…”
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