2013
DOI: 10.1109/tpwrs.2012.2207921
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Recovery mechanisms in day-ahead electricity markets with non-convexities - Part II: Implementation and numerical evaluation

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Cited by 22 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…Fabra et al (2006) have proven a similar revenue-equivalence result for uniform-price and discriminatory auctions without start-up costs. Wang et al (2012), Wang (2013) and Andrianesis et al (2013a;2013b) extend some of the results in Sioshansi and Nicholson (2011) to asymmetric producers and to alternative designs of uplift payments.…”
Section: 2mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…Fabra et al (2006) have proven a similar revenue-equivalence result for uniform-price and discriminatory auctions without start-up costs. Wang et al (2012), Wang (2013) and Andrianesis et al (2013a;2013b) extend some of the results in Sioshansi and Nicholson (2011) to asymmetric producers and to alternative designs of uplift payments.…”
Section: 2mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…To illustrate the benefits of the proposed integrated approach we deploy a 10-unit actual system taken from the Greek electricity market [8,Section II]. The full optimization model for this example is presented in [9,Section II].…”
Section: Numerical Examplementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Several approaches have been proposed for computing λ t , many of which suffer from inequities necessitating additional uplifts and side-payments in order to reach a market equilibrium that fairly clears the market (see Andrianesis et al, 2013a [1] and 2013b [2], for example); as a consequence, the relevant research is very active. In the current work, we focus on the algorithmic aspect of the problem, and we intentionally do not deal with such market design issues.…”
Section: Uniform Clearing Schemementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The unit variable production cost of the strategic producer (production unit 1) is 50 €/MWh, the price cap is 150 €/MWh, and the energy demand is equal to 1,000 MWh. The problem data are not fictitious, but correspond to factual units participating in the Greek electricity market, as described by Andrianesis et al, 2013b [2]. ), the system marginal price, the marginal unit, the optimal lowerlevel objective function value (f * ), and the corresponding objective value of the upper-level problem (F 1 ).…”
Section: Application Of the Algorithmmentioning
confidence: 99%
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