Recovering Understanding

Zagzebski, Linda

doi:10.1093/oso/9780197529171.003.0004

Cited by 25 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…According to these "antireductionists," understanding demands more than knowledge. Defenders of this view include Linda Zagzebski (2001), Jonathan Kvanvig (2003), Catherine Elgin (2004, 2007, Duncan Pritchard (2009, 2010, Alison Hills (2016), Wayne Riggs (2009), Christoph Baumberger (2011), Mikael Janvid (2012, Kevin Morris (2012), Yasha Rohwer (2014), Henk de Regt (2015, Sabine Ammon (2016), Insa Lawler (2016), Daniel Wilkenfeld (2017), andFinnur Dellsén (2017). These anti-reductionists have denied the reducibility of understanding to knowledge on various grounds, which I will explore in a moment.…”

Section: Is Understanding a Kind Of Knowledge?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is one of the most pressing questions in the epistemology of understanding because the reducibility of understanding to knowledge would suggest that we do not need separate accounts of these epistemic goods. Also, if understanding were simply a type of knowledge, then it would make little sense to say that understanding should replace knowledge as the primary focus of epistemology (e.g., Zagzebski 2001;Kvanvig 2003;Elgin 2006;Pritchard 2010). If, however, understanding were not reducible to knowledge, then this would threaten the justification for the focus on knowledge displayed in the history of epistemology.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Recent Work in the Epistemology of Understanding

Hannon¹

2021

American Philosophical Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The philosophical interest in the nature, value, and varieties of human understanding has swelled in recent years. This article will provide an overview of new research in the epistemology of understanding, with a particular focus on the following questions: What is understanding and why should we care about it? Is understanding reducible to knowledge? Does it require truth, belief, or justification? Can there be lucky understanding? Does it require 'grasping' or some kind of 'knowhow'? This cluster of questions has largely set the research agenda for the study of understanding in epistemology. This article will conclude by discussing some varieties of understanding and highlight directions for future research.Humans are naturally inquisitive creatures. As Aristotle observed, "All men by nature desire to know." But knowledge is not the only intellectual achievement at which humans aim, and it might not be the most valuable. As Albert Einstein once said, "Any fool can know; the point is to understand." 1 It is widely assumed that understanding is a valuable intellectual achievement; however, the cognitive state of understanding is itself poorly understood. What is understanding? Why is it valuable? And how do we achieve it? These questions are at the forefront of recent work in the epistemology of understanding. In this article, I will attempt to give a sense of the range and depth of this new research on the nature, value, and varieties of human understanding. I will also critically evaluate some of this work. 1 The Aristotle quote is from the opening line of his Metaphysics. The Einstein quote can be found in Christian (1990, p. 207).

show abstract

Section: Is Understanding a Kind Of Knowledge?mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Recent Work in the Epistemology of Understanding

Hannon¹

2021

American Philosophical Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…19 Michael says that a more immediate consequence is one that results from a shorter proof, where the length of a proof depends on how it is constructed from a set of primitive rules. The same extensional account 17 On the value of systemic understanding, see Zagzebski (2001) and Kvanvig (2003).…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

In Pursuit of the Non-Trivial

Caret

2019

Episteme

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper is about the underlying logical principles of scientific theories. In particular, it concerns ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) the principle that anything follows from a contradiction. ECQ is valid according to classical logic, but invalid according to paraconsistent logics. Some advocates of paraconsistency claim that there are ‘real’ inconsistent theories that do not erupt with completely indiscriminate, absurd commitments. They take this as evidence in favor of paraconsistency. Michael (2016) calls this the non-triviality strategy (NTS). He argues that this strategy fails in its purpose. I will show that Michael's criticism significantly over-reaches. The fundamental problem is that he places more of a burden on the advocate of paraconsistency than on the advocate of classical logic. The weaknesses in Michael's argument are symptomatic of this preferential treatment of one viewpoint in the debate over another. He does, however, make important observations that allow us to clarify some of the complexities involved in giving a logical reconstruction of a theory. I will argue that there are abductive arguments deserving of further consideration for the claim that paraconsistent logic offers the best explanation of the practice of inconsistent science. In this sense, the debate is still very much open.

show abstract

“…See, for instance,Khalifa (2013) on the relationship between different types of understanding.4 Elgin (2017: 43).5 See, also, Greco (2014) on this distinction.2 SeeElgin (2004Elgin ( , 2007Elgin ( , 2017. While I use Elgin's view as a foil, other helpful discussions of nonfactive approaches to understanding include:Zagzebski (2001), de Regt (2015,Potochnik (2017) andRancourt (2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…46. 13 Beyond Elgin, influential early defenders of the idea that understanding has distinctive epistemic value include:Zagzebski (2001),Kvanvig (2003), andPritchard (2009).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Truth About Better Understanding?

Ross

2021

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The notion of understanding occupies an increasingly prominent place in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, and moral theory. A central and ongoing debate about the nature of understanding is how it relates to the truth. In a series of influential contributions, Catherine Elgin has used a variety of familiar motivations for antirealism in philosophy of science to defend a non-factive theory of understanding. Key to her position are: (1) the fact that false theories can contribute to the upwards trajectory of scientific understanding, and (2) the essential role of inaccurate idealisations in scientific research. Using Elgin’s arguments as a foil, I show that a strictly factive theory of understanding has resources with which to offer a unified response to both the problem of idealisations and the role of false theories in the upwards trajectory of scientific understanding. Hence, strictly factive theories of understanding are viable notwithstanding these forceful criticisms.

show abstract

Recovering Understanding

Cited by 25 publications

References 0 publications

Recent Work in the Epistemology of Understanding

Recent Work in the Epistemology of Understanding

In Pursuit of the Non-Trivial

The Truth About Better Understanding?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About