A problem typically encountered when studying complex systems is the limitedness of the information available on their topology, which hinders our understanding of their structure and of the dynamical processes taking place on them. A paramount example is provided by financial networks, whose data are privacy protected: Banks publicly disclose only their aggregate exposure towards other banks, keeping individual exposures towards each single bank secret. Yet, the estimation of systemic risk strongly depends on the detailed structure of the interbank network. The resulting challenge is that of using aggregate information to statistically reconstruct a network and correctly predict its higher-order properties. Standard approaches either generate unrealistically dense networks, or fail to reproduce the observed topology by assigning homogeneous link weights. Here, we develop a reconstruction method, based on statistical mechanics concepts, that makes use of the empirical link density in a highly nontrivial way. Technically, our approach consists in the preliminary estimation of node degrees from empirical node strengths and link density, followed by a maximum-entropy inference based on a combination of empirical strengths and estimated degrees. Our method is successfully tested on the international trade network and the interbank money market, and represents a valuable tool for gaining insights on privacy-protected or partially accessible systems. Reconstructing the statistical properties of a network when only partial information is available represents a key open problem in the field of statistical physics of complex systems [1,2]. Yet, addressing this issue can lead to many concrete applications. A paramount example is provided by financial networks, where nodes represent financial institutions and links stand for the various types of financial ties, such as loans or derivative contracts. These ties result in dependencies among institutions and constitute the ground for the propagation of financial distress across the network. However, due to confidentiality issues, the information that regulators are able to collect on mutual exposures is very limited [3], hindering the analysis of the system resilience to the spreading of financial distress-which depends on the structure of the whole network [4,5]. Typically, the analysis of systemic risk has been pursued by trying to estimate the unknown link weights of the network via a maximum homogeneity principle [6][7][8], looking for the adjacency matrix with minimal distance from the uniform matrix that also satisfies the imposed constraints (e.g., the budget of individual banks). These approaches are also known as dense reconstruction methods, as they assume that the network is fully connected, a hypothesis that represents their strongest limitation. In fact, not only empirical networks do show a very heterogeneous distribution of the connectivity, but such a dense reconstruction leads to systemic risk underestimation [2,8]. More refined methods such as sparse reconst...