Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism

Briesen, Jochen

doi:10.1163/18756735-90000878

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 9 publications

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“…Boult (2013) didn't expose a flaw in Cohen's reasoning, but argued against the explanatory backdrop Cohen employed to explain our ignorance of SK. Lastly, Briesen (2010) defends UP based on explanatory considerations. We reject this reading and instead defend UP as a question concerning the epistemic merit of our beliefs in general.…”

Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closure, Underdetermination and the peculiarity of Sceptical scenarios

Tana

2022

Theoria

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Epistemologists understand radical skepticism as arising from two principles: Closure and Underdetermination. Both possess intuitive prima facie support for their endorsement.Understanding how they engender skepticism is crucial for any reasonable anti-skeptical attempt. The contemporary discussion has focused on elucidating the relationship between them to ascertain whether they establish distinct skeptical questions and which of the two constitutes the ultimately fundamental threat. Major contributions to this debate are due to Brueckner, Cohen, and Pritchard. This contribution aims at defending Brueckner's contention that underdetermination expresses the fundamental skeptical threat and that the closure-based argument can ultimately be reduced to it, at least concerning skeptical contexts. This will be achieved by undermining Cohen's objections to Brueckner on both counts. Cohen's argument endorses a picture of evidential underdetermination, which, while apt for non-skeptical contexts, cannot be applied to radical skepticism. A comparison with a case of scientific underdetermination is developed to argue for this idea. Our argument is then applied to the principle equivalence issue and to objections against it. It is then shown how this analysis possesses a distinctive effect on our understanding of the skeptical threat and the assessment of successful anti-skeptical strategies.

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Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closure, Underdetermination and the peculiarity of Sceptical scenarios

Tana

2022

Theoria

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Reliabilism, bootstrapping, and epistemic circularity

Briesen

2013

Synthese

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Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge (cf. the so-called bootstrapping-problem or the easy-knowledge-problem). For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject reliabilism. Those who try to defend reliabilism have two basic options: (I) accept that reliabilism does not rule out circular reasoning (or bootstrapping), but argue that this kind of reasoning is not as epistemically "bad" as it seems, or (II) hold on to the view that circular reasoning (or bootstrapping) is epistemically "bad", but deny that reliabilism really allows this kind of reasoning. Option (I) has been spelled out in several ways, all of which have found to be problematic. Option (II) has not been discussed very widely. Vogel (J Philos 97: 602-623, 2000) considers and quickly dismisses it on the basis of three reasons. Weisberg (Philos Phenomenol Res 81: 525-548, 2010) has shown in detail that one of these reasons is unconvincing. In this paper I argue that the other two reasons are unconvincing as well and that therefore option (II) might in fact be a more promising starting point to defend reliabilism than option (I).

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Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination

Boult

2013

Philosophia

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Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism

Cited by 4 publications

References 9 publications

Closure, Underdetermination and the peculiarity of Sceptical scenarios

Closure, Underdetermination and the peculiarity of Sceptical scenarios

Reliabilism, bootstrapping, and epistemic circularity

Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination

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