Reconciling Ontic Structural Realism and Ontological Emergence

Cordovil, João L.; Santos, Gil C.; Symons, John

doi:10.1007/s10699-021-09828-8

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 55 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Such a quantum physical indecomposability will form a basis for emergence of not only language, but everything that is built on quantum physics, which according to modern scientific reductionistic views includes everything in the world. This forms a strong basis for those emergentists who wish to establish emergence as a universal phenomenon (see, e.g., Cordovil et al, 2022). But it does not provide sufficient basis for language emergentists who seemingly claim that language belongs to the exclusive club of emergent phenomena because of its peculiar qualities.…”

Section: Unexplainabilitymentioning

confidence: 98%

“…A dedicated emergentist linguist can bite the bullet and reject that the only causal powers in the world are those of physical matter. Such a linguist can subscribe to the alternative metaphysics of ontic structural realism (Cordovil et al, 2022; Ladyman, 1998; McKenzie, 2017; Santos, 2015), according to which structures are real natural objects capable of exerting causal effects. One who accepts this metaphysics can safely attribute causal powers to structural topologies.…”

Section: Characterising Language Emergence By Independence Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A philosophical analysis of the emergence of language

Tabatabaei Ghomi,

Benítez‐Burraco

2023

Theoria

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There is a research programme in linguistics that is founded on describing language as an emergent phenomenon. This paper clarifies how the core concept of emergence is deployed in this emergentist programme. We show that if one adopts the weak understandings of the concept of language emergence, the emergentist programme is not fundamentally different from the other non‐emergentist research programmes in linguistics. On the other hand, if one adopts the stronger understandings of emergence then the programme would have a unique character, but at the cost of some corollaries (philosophical, but not only) which the emergentist linguists would seemingly want to avoid. We show that if the emergentists accept those corollaries, the resulting hypothetical emergentist programme would be totally different from the emergentist programme in its present shape. We conclude that the emergentist programme, as it stands, should be either abandoned or reshaped in both theory and methodology.

show abstract

Section: Unexplainabilitymentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Characterising Language Emergence By Independence Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A philosophical analysis of the emergence of language

Tabatabaei Ghomi,

Benítez‐Burraco

2023

Theoria

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Despite that most of Kim's arguments and works are directed to solve the specific problems due to the mind-body dualism and the related issue of mental causality, they may be easily generalized to all genuine cases of dualism and higher causation that involve the emergence of structural organization (cf. Cordovil et al 2022, Ferrari 2023, Santos 2015, Wilson 2021). In a nutshell, Kim argues that NRP cannot accept genuine higher causation, like mental interactions, because otherwise NRP would be either committed with dualism or simply self-inconsistent, in virtue of Kim's Supervenience Argument (2005Argument ( , 2006) that tells us that irreducible supervenient causation, if any, is preempted by the intended (physicalist) causal model.…”

Section: Physicalist Substances Metaphysics and Dualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yet, if we look at OSR, things do clearly change but, ultimately, problems are still there. Indeed, the OSR-model "automatically generates" higher or further ontological levels (Cordovil et al 2022). The naturalist appeal of OSR is, thus, bounded to the application of some "physicalist constraint" concerning the restriction to the first order level of existence that is provided by some external source, like physics.…”

Section: From Ontological Dualism To Metaphysical Dualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Substance metaphysics is incompatible with the causal closure of the metaphysical realm

Ferrari

2023

REFP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The present paper argues that substantialist metaphysics are in tension with the physicalist idea that the universe is causally closed. The argument is a rather specific one and proceeds through three steps. The first step consists in arguing that monistic substance metaphysics allow for the existence of entities that cannot belong to the intended first order domain. This result sensitively depends on the nature of substances as invariant entities. The second step concludes that, if further domains are to be admitted, then they are inhabited by “higher” or (systematically) “nonstandard” entities and that, in both cases if not made somehow innocuous, such entities may take part on the metaphysical construction of the world through their own distinctive properties and causal powers. However, this latter claim is in contradiction with causal closure. But closure is the principle that mainly characterizes physicalist approaches in metaphysics and as such physicalist metaphysics cannot get rid of it. Who attempted making exotic properties and causal powers innocuous usually appealed to the Supervenience Argument. Unfortunately, as the third step proves, this argument is invalid. Finally, the paper looks forward and toward alternative models for physicalist metaphysics, like processbased models. Keywords: Metaphysics of Quantities, Abstraction Principles, Locationism.

show abstract

“…A articulação entre estas três teses metafísicas, embora não no contexto do problema da medição, já se mostrou ser possível emCordovil et al (2022) eSantos (2015Santos ( , 2021.…”

unclassified

Para uma Interpretação Emergentista do Problema da Medição

Cordovil

2023

Perspectivas

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Como é bem sabido, o problema da medição é um problema antigo – talvez mesmo o único problema - da Mecânica Quântica ou, pelo menos, de sua interpretação. Grosso modo, o problema da medição surge da transição de um sistema em Mecânica Quântica de um estado de superposição para um estado bem definido. Ou seja, da transição de um sistema num estado “quântico” para um “estado clássico”. Como também é bem conhecido, várias são as tentativas de solução para o problema de medição. Apesar de existir uma vasta gama de opções, a maioria das soluções apresentadas assume o pressuposto que a Mecânica Quântica é aplicável, em princípio, universalmente; isto é, a todos sistemas físicos. No entanto, talvez possamos questionar essa suposição e talvez essa suposição seja o que torna o problema de medição problemático. Este artigo tem como objetivo i) analisar o pressuposto da universalidade da aplicabilidade da Mecânica Quântica e consequências para a formulação do problema da medição; ii) explorar a ideia de que as entidades clássicas não são ontologicamente redutíveis, mas emergentes de entidades quânticas.

show abstract

Reconciling Ontic Structural Realism and Ontological Emergence

Cited by 6 publications

References 55 publications

A philosophical analysis of the emergence of language

A philosophical analysis of the emergence of language

Substance metaphysics is incompatible with the causal closure of the metaphysical realm

Para uma Interpretação Emergentista do Problema da Medição

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About