Reconciling current approaches to blindsight

Overgaard, Morten; Mogensen, Jesper

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.003

Cited by 27 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 44 publications

(57 reference statements)

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“…Evidence from various sources advocates against an absolute dichotomy between conscious and non-conscious states (for reviews see, e.g., Overgaard and Mogensen, 2014, 2015). Considering the available data, we have proposed that when information within various cognitive domains is processed to a sufficiently “high level” it becomes available to conscious experience (e.g., Overgaard and Mogensen, 2014, 2015, 2017).…”

Section: Relating Conscious States To Neural Connectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Considering the available data, we have proposed that when information within various cognitive domains is processed to a sufficiently “high level” it becomes available to conscious experience (e.g., Overgaard and Mogensen, 2014, 2015, 2017). Thus, we do not see consciousness as a separate “module” or faculty – but rather as a – to varying degrees present – aspect of other cognitive processes.…”

Section: Relating Conscious States To Neural Connectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And a “higher” level of hypercomputations – a level at which mental representations are mediated by a connectionist network combining the specific modules of the previous level (see Figure 1 ). We have developed such a novel approach to the construction of a computational level and an alternative understanding of modularity (e.g., Mogensen and Malá, 2009; Mogensen, 2011a,c, 2012a,b, 2014, 2015; Overgaard and Mogensen, 2011, 2014, 2015). …”

Section: Relating Conscious States To Neural Connectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The overall principles described by the model are, however, believed to be of a more general nature and are likely to be involved in neural and cognitive mechanisms associated with other domains than those of problem solving (e.g., Mogensen, 2012b). Partly on the basis of such assumptions, we have (Overgaard and Mogensen, 2014, 2015) developed a new variant of the REF model called REFCON. The REFCON model addresses mechanisms associated with perceptual analysis and conscious awareness.…”

Section: The Refcon Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reorganization of the Connectivity between Elementary Functions – A Model Relating Conscious States to Neural Connections

Mogensen

Overgaard

2017

Front. Psychol.

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In the present paper it is argued that the “neural correlate of consciousness” (NCC) does not appear to be a separate “module” – but an aspect of information processing within the neural substrate of various cognitive processes. Consequently, NCC can only be addressed adequately within frameworks that model the general relationship between neural processes and mental states – and take into account the dynamic connectivity of the brain. We presently offer the REFGEN (general reorganization of elementary functions) model as such a framework. This model builds upon and expands the REF (reorganization of elementary functions) and REFCON (of elementary functions and consciousness) models. All three models integrate the relationship between the neural and mental layers of description via the construction of an intermediate level dealing with computational states. The importance of experience based organization of neural and cognitive processes is stressed. The models assume that the mechanisms of consciousness are in principle the same as the basic mechanisms of all aspects of cognition – when information is processed to a sufficiently “high level” it becomes available to conscious experience. The NCC is within the REFGEN model seen as aspects of the dynamic and experience driven reorganizations of the synaptic connectivity between the neurocognitive “building blocks” of the model – the elementary functions.

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Section: Relating Conscious States To Neural Connectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Relating Conscious States To Neural Connectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Relating Conscious States To Neural Connectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Refcon Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reorganization of the Connectivity between Elementary Functions – A Model Relating Conscious States to Neural Connections

Mogensen

Overgaard

2017

Front. Psychol.

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“…Besides, it is disputable whether experiences in type-2 blindsight are visual (see e.g. Overgaard and Mogensen 2015).…”

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confidence: 99%

Naïve realism about unconscious perception

Zięba

2017

Synthese

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Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception.

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Methodological reductionism or methodological dualism? In search of a middle ground

Overgaard

2023

Phenom Cogn Sci

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The contrasts between so-called objective and subjective measures of consciousness have been a dominating topic of discussion for decades. The debate has classically been dominated by two positions – that subjective measures may be completely or partially reduced to objective measures, and, alternatively that they must exist in parallel. I argue that many problems relate to subjective reports as they can be imprecise and vulnerable to a number of potential confounding factors. However, I also argue that despite the fact that subjective reports are fallible, all objective measures are derived from subjective measures, and, thus, will never under normal circumstances be more correct. I propose that the best and possibly only realistic way forward is a specific version of a “middle ground”: to attempt to improve subjective reports in a collaboration with objective research methods.

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Reconciling current approaches to blindsight

Cited by 27 publications

References 44 publications

Reorganization of the Connectivity between Elementary Functions – A Model Relating Conscious States to Neural Connections

Reorganization of the Connectivity between Elementary Functions – A Model Relating Conscious States to Neural Connections

Naïve realism about unconscious perception

Methodological reductionism or methodological dualism? In search of a middle ground

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