Recognition and Feminist Thought

Bratu, Christine; Lepold, Kristina

doi:10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8_71-1

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…For example, Congdon takes the same deeper indignity to be at work in racial domination that is supported by epistemologies of ignorance as discussed by Charles Mills. For Congdon, as for Bratu and Lepold (2018), theories of recognition may therefore afford particularly fruitful ways to theorise what goes on (and wrong) in cases of epistemic injustice. Most basically, "a person A recognises another person B if A realises that B has some property p that is normatively relevant and if A treats B accordingly".…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideal Theory, Epistemologies of Ignorance, and (Mis)Recognition

Mikkola¹

2022

Epistemic Injustice and the Philosophy of Recognition

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideal Theory, Epistemologies of Ignorance, and (Mis)Recognition

Mikkola¹

2022

Epistemic Injustice and the Philosophy of Recognition

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“…Second, I connect this social-normative conception of epistemological concepts with some central themes in Axel Honneth's neo-Hegelian theory of recognition. Epistemological themes arise throughout work in neo-Hegelian recognition theory, 3 and several authors have already noted connections between the philosophy of recognition and work on epistemic injustice (McConkey 2004;Pohlhaus 2014, 105-106;Congdon 2017;Giladi 2018;Bratu and Lepold 2018). I add to these efforts by arguing that the essentially recognitive 2 The contemporary literature on the ethics and politics of epistemology is immense and growing.…”

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confidence: 96%

“Knower” as an Ethical Concept: From Epistemic Agency to Mutual Recognition

Congdon

2018

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Recent discussions in critical social epistemology have raised the idea that the concept “knower” is not only an epistemological concept but an ethical concept as well. Though this idea plays a central role in these discussions, the theoretical underpinnings of the claim have not received extended scrutiny. This paper explores the idea that “knower” is an irreducibly ethical concept in an effort to defend its use as a critical concept. In section 1, I begin with the claim that “knower” is an irreducibly normative and social concept, drawing from some ideas in Wilfrid Sellars. In section 2, I argue that one’s being a knower involves demands for various sorts of ethically laden recognition. I develop this thought by arguing that Axel Honneth’s threefold typology of recognition—love, respect, and esteem—finds clear expression within the context of socio-epistemic practice. I conclude in section 3 by arguing that Miranda Fricker’s proposed “analogy” between epistemic and moral perception should be modified to indicate a closer relationship than mere analogy.

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Recognition and Feminist Thought

Cited by 2 publications

References 19 publications

Ideal Theory, Epistemologies of Ignorance, and (Mis)Recognition

Ideal Theory, Epistemologies of Ignorance, and (Mis)Recognition

“Knower” as an Ethical Concept: From Epistemic Agency to Mutual Recognition

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