Reciprocity and wage undercutting

Dufwenberg, Martin; Kirchsteiger, Georg

doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(99)00047-1

Cited by 80 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Positive reciprocity refers to cooperative responses while negative reciprocity refers to retaliatory responses (Fehr and Gächter (2000)). The model that Leuven et al (2005) use represents an adjustment to an earlier reciprocity theory of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000). That model shows that a firm's investment in general training may be affected by a worker's sensitivity with respect to reciprocity.…”

Section: Iib Personality Traits and Training Participationmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Employability-miles’ and worker employability awareness

2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu This article studies the use and impact of a firm-sponsored training ("Employability-miles") voucher scheme that aims to stimulate employees to develop a more active attitude toward their own employability. Using data from two surveys of the firm's workforce, we find that voucher use is related to various personality traits and personal characteristics. In particular, a worker's ambition, goal setting, and education level are positively related to voucher use. In addition, women and those with longer tenure spend their vouchers more often. Conversely, workers with a more positive self-image as well as those who are negatively reciprocal spend their vouchers less often. The negative relation between voucher use and negative reciprocity suggests that workers who are more negatively reciprocal perceive the voucher as an HR tool for outplacement. Further, we find that voucher use positively affects worker employability awareness and willingness to train. Remarkably, participation in non-voucher training shows little relation to personality traits. From a human resources perspective, this finding suggests that by employing a voucher scheme, the firm makes training participation more dependent on employee personality and individual characteristics instead of the human resources development strategy of the firm. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SJEL Classification: J24, M53

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Section: Iib Personality Traits and Training Participationmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Employability-miles’ and worker employability awareness

2014

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“…manager and shareholder then follow from differences in perceived kindness λ, see below. An alternative approach leading to similar conclusions would be to let Y vary directly with the identity of the other player considered (see Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2000). Between workers Y can vary to capture heterogeneity in workers' preferences for reciprocation.…”

Section: Appendix a Formal Justification Of The Reciprocity Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control

Maximiano

Sloof

Sonnemans

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…Gaechter and Fehr (2002) give a comprehensive overview on gift-exchange-experiments with abstract (merely monetary) effort choice. These results are generally explained by concepts of social preferences like reciprocity (Rabin, 1993;Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2000) and inequity aversion or fairness (Akerlof, 1982;Falk & Fischbacher, 2006;Fehr & Schmidt, 1999;Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). Furthermore, a number of real-effort or field experiment studies have shown that the effects mentioned above are also present in more realistic environments (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Incentive Impact of the Fixed Wage – A Real Effort Experiment

Manthei¹,

Mohnen²

2013

German Journal of Human Resource Management: Zeitschrift für Pe

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The incentive impact of the fixed wage-A real effort experiment ** According to most simple agency models only the performance dependent part of the compensation drives the agent's effort decision. However, we show that this is not necessarily the case for reference dependent and loss averse agents. Based on Pokorny (2008) we firstly analyze the impact of the fixed wage on work performance within a linear incentive contract when agents are loss averse. Secondly, we test the resulting hypotheses in an economic real effort experiment. Varying the fixed wage but keeping the piece rate constant over treatments, we find a non-monotonic slope of effort in the fixed payment with significantly higher effort levels for a very low fixed wage. Very high fixed payments also yield higher subject performance but to a minor and less robust extent. Die Anreizwirkung von Fixlöhnen-Ein Real Effort Experiment Ein typisches Ergebnis einfacher Prinzipal-Agent-Modelle ist, dass die Arbeitsanstrengung des Agenten lediglich vom leistungsabhängigen Teil der Vergütung getrieben wird. In dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, dass dies nicht notwendigerweise gilt, wenn Agenten referenzpunktabhängige Präferenzen und Verlustaversion aufweisen. Zunächst wird basierend auf einem Modell von Pokorny (2008) analysiert, wie der Fixlohn die Arbeitsanstrengung innerhalb eines linearen Anreizvertrages bei Verlustaversion beeinflusst. Darauffolgend werden die resultierenden Hypothesen in einem ökonomischen Experiment mit realen Anstrengungen getestet. Bei variierenden fixen, zugleich aber konstanten Stücklöhnen zeigen die Resultate einen nicht-monotonen Verlauf der Leistungsergebnisse im Fixlohn. Bei sehr niedrigem treten signifikant bessere Leistungsergebnisse auf als bei einem mittleren Niveau. Auch sehr hoher Fixlohn steigert die Performance der Probanden, allerdings nicht so stark und auch weniger robust..

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Reciprocity and wage undercutting

Cited by 80 publications

References 19 publications

‘Employability-miles’ and worker employability awareness

‘Employability-miles’ and worker employability awareness

Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control

The Incentive Impact of the Fixed Wage – A Real Effort Experiment

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