2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2007.04.005
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Recent developments in liability for nondisclosure of capital market information

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2012
2012
2016
2016

Publication Types

Select...
2
1

Relationship

0
3

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 0 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Asymmetric information may cause the less informed market participants to conclude contracts to their own detriment (Kalss, 2007). With regards to the provision of financial services, Malherbe and Morojele (2001) reported that asymmetric information can be so extreme that the client knows virtually nothing of the product being offered, the nature of the organization offering it and the intermediary advising the client to buy it.…”
Section: Asymmetric Information and Intermediariesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Asymmetric information may cause the less informed market participants to conclude contracts to their own detriment (Kalss, 2007). With regards to the provision of financial services, Malherbe and Morojele (2001) reported that asymmetric information can be so extreme that the client knows virtually nothing of the product being offered, the nature of the organization offering it and the intermediary advising the client to buy it.…”
Section: Asymmetric Information and Intermediariesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First movers will try to benefit from increased or maintained reputation in the capital market (as well as societal image effects). However, being first movers will have costs, i.e., direct, proprietary and liability costs (Healy and Palepu, 2001;Kalss, 2007).…”
Section: Differentiation In a Harmonisation Environmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As regards the importance of professional background, one exception is our finding of a significant relationship between companies with board members with accounting/finance background and the choice of a high level of corporate governance reporting. This could be interpreted as support for influence of board members predisposed toward high quality reporting based on expertise in assessing capital market risks and rewards (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001;Kalss, 2007).…”
Section: Hypotheses Testsmentioning
confidence: 99%