Recasting the Threat of Chemical Terrorism in the EU: the Issue of Returnees from the Syrian Conflict

Abstract

Chemical terrorist attacks by non-state actors have traditionally been characterised as low probability events; however, the apparent normalisation of chemical weapons use, including by terrorists, in the ongoing conflict in Syria is causing some in the international security community to question whether it will remain low probability. For Europe there is an additional potential concern, namely the numbers of EU citizens who are "foreign fighters" and whose return from the conflict zone might also result in "importing" chemical weapons use. This article examines the rise of the "chemical weapons-returning foreign fighter" narrative and considers aspects of the European response. These responses predate the current concerns and include important efforts to create a robust public health response, such as early alert and communication systems, so that the attractiveness of these weapons being used within a European context might be reduced. Although there are limitations as to how far one can transfer what happens in a Syrian context to Europe, the suggestion is made that some of the framing assumptions within this response architecture may be now inadvertently limiting the potential to identify and respond to chemical attacks.

The European Union’s Response to the CBRN Terrorist Threat: A Multiple Streams Approach

“…Concerns were rapidly expressed by researchers and officials alike over the group's interest in acquiring CBRN weapons. From 2012 onwards, repeated allegations were made that chemical weapons, such as chlorine, sarin and sulphur mustard agents, had been used in the Syrian conflict, not only by the regime forces, but also by Daesh (McLeish, 2017; UN News, 2019). It was also reported that the terrorist group had 'developed at least a small-scale chemical weapons program[me], and may have manufactured low-quality blister agent or obtained chemical arms from undeclared or abandoned [Syrian] stocks' (Chivers, 2015).…”

“…In an article on Daesh and chemical weapons written in 2016, Quillen (2016) argued that 'a clearer picture emerges of a dedicated and increasingly successful chemical weapons program[me] that threatens military forces and civilian populations around the world'. European states, in particular, became increasingly concerned about the possibility that returning foreign fighters involved in the Syrian conflict might use chemical weapons (McLeish, 2017). Shortly after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, which were perpetrated notably by several terrorists with links to Syria, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared the following: 'We must not rule anything out.…”

“…(Bar-Yaacov, 2015), another writing in NATO Review wondered whether this terrorist group could 'go nuclear' before warning that '[we] might soon enter a stage of CBRN terrorism, never before imaginable' (Rudischhauser, 2015). A particular concern for European governments has been the potential use of chemical weapons by so-called 'foreign terrorist fighters' returning from Syria to Europe (McLeish, 2017), especially in the wake of the collapse of the self-proclaimed caliphate.…”

EU external health security policy and law

“…91 In the EU, over the last two decades particular attention paid has been paid to the threat of non-state actors' access to CBRN materials. 92 These concerns led to the adoption of a number of legal instruments at EU level. The European Security Strategy of 2003, adopted by the European Council after the 9/11 attacks, places special emphasis on the possibility of non-state actors gaining access to Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD).…”

Special Character of the Polish Counterterrorism Policy as Compared to the European Union

“…explosives. This gives the possibility of many victims even with uncomplicated measures (McLeish, 2017). This also affects the choice of targets directly attacked, with the consequence that the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated on objects that guarantee at least a potentially large number of victims and damages, e.g.…”