From Bullets to Ballots 2018
DOI: 10.4324/9781315112206-7
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Rebel-to-political and back? Hamas as a security provider in Gaza between rebellion, politics and governance

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

0
2
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
2

Relationship

0
2

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
references
References 1 publication
0
2
0
Order By: Relevance
“…This distinction opens up for the investigation of questions that are central to understanding businesssociety relations and their governance. These include (a) how state actors, for deep-seated historical, economic, and political reasons, are generally limited if not structurally constrained in terms of setting and enforcing rules, and providing collective goods; nor do they (fully) control the monopoly of the use of force, and (b) how non-state actors, including businesses, NGOs, international organizations, but also violent non-state actors (rebel groups, war lords, criminal networks) can make collectively binding rules and act as providers of collective goods (Berti & Gutiérrez, 2016;Cammett, 2014;Felbab-Brown et al, 2018;Jo, 2015;Magaloni et al, 2020;Reno, 2010;Roy, 2011). In some cases, violent non-state actors even engage in full-scale governance in a given territory ("rebelocracy"), while in other cases they provide and maintain security, but leave broader rulemaking and service provision to others ("aliocracy," see Arjona, 2015Arjona, , 2016.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This distinction opens up for the investigation of questions that are central to understanding businesssociety relations and their governance. These include (a) how state actors, for deep-seated historical, economic, and political reasons, are generally limited if not structurally constrained in terms of setting and enforcing rules, and providing collective goods; nor do they (fully) control the monopoly of the use of force, and (b) how non-state actors, including businesses, NGOs, international organizations, but also violent non-state actors (rebel groups, war lords, criminal networks) can make collectively binding rules and act as providers of collective goods (Berti & Gutiérrez, 2016;Cammett, 2014;Felbab-Brown et al, 2018;Jo, 2015;Magaloni et al, 2020;Reno, 2010;Roy, 2011). In some cases, violent non-state actors even engage in full-scale governance in a given territory ("rebelocracy"), while in other cases they provide and maintain security, but leave broader rulemaking and service provision to others ("aliocracy," see Arjona, 2015Arjona, , 2016.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These contributions focus on the challenges of transforming from armed movements to political parties, the internal workings of party organizations (e.g. Allison 2010; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Sindre 2016b) and the factors that influence whether and how parties adapt to democracy (Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Ishiyama and Batta 2011b; Lyons 2016a; Manning 2008). Other work has focused on former armed groups and conflict management, confirming that rebel group inclusion is key to ensuring political stability following a peace settlement (Marshall and Ishiyama 2016).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%