Reassessing Turkey’s Soft Power: The Rules of Attraction

Abstract

Since the mid-2000s, Turkey has incorporated a soft power discourse into its foreign policy agenda and shifted its attention toward building up its soft power infrastructure. Up until 2013, Turkey was applauded as a regional powerhouse, an important player in the soft power arena, and a beacon of democracy and stability within an unstable region. However, the restrictions on free speech, media censorship, and the crackdown on the opposition have impacted Turkey’s current soft power ranking. While expanding its diplomatic network and public diplomacy apparatus to wield soft power, Turkey’s global reputation has seen a downward spiral. This article investigates the role that political leadership and political values play in determining Turkey’s soft power capacity. This article’s main contention is that while Turkey increases its global engagement and capacity to appeal non-Western audiences, its capacity to attract international audiences particularly in the West has diminished due to its democratic backsliding.

Regional Power Role and Intervention: The Turkish Case Over Syria in the 2000s

“…For instance, TUSCON, which represented mostly small- and medium-sized new rural Anatolian businesses, played an important role in the context of opening up to the region economically (Tür, 2011, p. 592). It has also been widely argued that not only TUSCON but also other Gülenist organizations were important players in supporting government policies toward the Middle East 2 2 After the 2016 military coup attempt in Turkey, the Gülenist organizations were outlawed. (Çevik, 2019, p. 11; Schenkkan, 2018).…”

“…In addition to the growing importance of non-state organizations, some public institutions, such as Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), Kızılay (Turkish Red Crescent), TOKİ (Housing Development Administration of Turkey), and AFAD (Emergency Disaster Management Presidency), were set up to advance Turkey’s humanitarian activities throughout the world, which also played a significant role in its soft power projection in the Middle East. Turkey had a strong network of government and nongovernment actors that provided foreign assistance, which raised Turkey’s “national brand as a benevolent nation” (Çevik, 2019, p. 9). Moreover, positive developments during the EU candidacy process in 2002–2007 gave a boost to Turkey’s soft power in the region, since the government introduced a series of liberal reforms regarding human rights, freedom of expression, and minority rights (Öniş & Kutlay, 2017, p. 13).…”

“…In 2017, 98 percent of Turkish humanitarian expenditures was allocated to support Syrian refugees, which made Turkey the most generous donor to the Syrians (Çevik, 2019, p. 8). According to the government figures the cost of the refugees reached to about US$30 billion (Salt, 2018, p. 81).…”

“…Similarly, Turkey was ranked 110th among 160 countries by The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index in 2018 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). According to Freedom House ranking, Turkey’s internet freedom score also dropped from 42 in 2009 to 66 in 2017 in the list that scores countries with 0 being least free and 100 being free (Çevik, 2019, p. 15).…”

Pastors of a dispersed flock: Diyanet officers and Turkey's art of governing its diaspora

“…beyond its territorial borders. These institutions are included in the country's push for 'public diplomacy' and form part of several soft-power strategies (Çevik, 2019;Benhaïm and Öktem, 2015).…”