Soon after the Lehman crisis, the International Monetary Fund surprised its critics with a reconsideration of its research and advice on fiscal policy. The paper traces the influence that the Fund's senior management and research elite has had on the recalibration of the IMF's doctrine on fiscal policy. The findings suggest and shows that overall there has been some selective incorporation of unorthodox ideas in the Fund's fiscal doctrine, while the strong thesis that austerity has expansionary effects has been rejected. Indeed, the Fund's new orthodoxy is concerned with the recessionary effects of fiscal consolidation and, more recently, endorses calls for a more progressive adjustment of the costs of fiscal sustainability. These changes notwithstanding, the IMF's adaptive incremental transformation on fiscal policy issues falls short of a paradigm shift and is best conceived of as an important recalibration of the pre-crisis status quo.and rejection of some elements of orthodoxy that this paper uncovers have been limited.Keywords: IMF, staff research, Keynesian, New Consensus macroeconomics, austerity
From great expectations to modest recalibrationsIn 2008, many expected that the widespread outrage and economic hardship caused by the financial crisis would lead to the replacement of the neoliberal policy paradigm. The rediscovery of Keynesian macroeconomics in 2008Keynesian macroeconomics in -2009 by the leaders of the G20 seemed to indicate that change was imminent. Indeed, mainstream macroeconomic and finance economics seemed on their way to a historical trial. For a while, decades of debates over the details of the best version of the efficient market hypothesis and the most refined dynamic general stochastic equilibrium models seemed out of place.In the U.S., mythical figures of mainstream macroeconomists were dragged in front of the Congress to explain themselves, their apathy for lawmakers' concerns about unemployment exposed in full view.1 Allan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Fed and the guru of neoliberal practice offered a few public admissions of contrition over his beliefs. Financial Times editors called for the nationalization of large financial institutions and their transformation in public utilities. In Paris, Nicholas Sarkozy, a conservative president who campaigned on a neoliberal ticket the year before, allowed himself to be photographed leafing through a copy of Das Kapital. The world, it seemed, was ripe for a new economic model based on anything but more of the same neoliberal theory. If reality was of any empirical use, the case against mainstream economics was clear:[g]overning neoliberal ideas pretty much denied such a crisis could ever happen. So when it happened it was bound to open up some room for ideas that said such events were bound to happen if you left markets alone to regulate themselves, which is exactly the Keynesian point. Given this, it was hard to defend publicly the logic of self-correcting markets at a time when they were so obviously not self-correcting...