In response to Wong (2006) and Wyatt and Midkiff (2006), we argue that behaviors related to biologism-i.e., believing that biological explanations are more explanatory than they really are-and other aspects of biological psychiatry are susceptible to behavior analysis, and we explore the possibility of such an analysis with special attention to the interests of clinicians and clinical researchers. We also propose that behavior analysis, biology, and science in general may best be served by the adoption and promotion of a more philosophically and scientifically rigorous view of the interaction between biological and behavioral factors. Such a view would promote rational integration rather than opposition of theoretical systems. KEYWORDS: biology, behavior analysis, antidepressant medicationIn this commentary on Wong (2006) and Wyatt and Midkiff (2006), we argue two main points, both related to the broader discursive frame within which debate-whether scientific, clinical, or political-about the relative merits of biological and behavioral approaches takes place. The first point follows from Wyatt and Midkiff's statement that a "paradigm shift" away from the biological perspective would represent progress. For "paradigm shift," we read behavior change. We therefore discuss the nature of such a behavior change, focusing on concerns relevant to our own backgrounds and aims as clinicians and clinical researchers. This perspective emphasizes a pragmatic and humanistic application of behavior analytic principles in service of optimum clinical outcomes.The second point we wish to argue concerns the handling of the duality of biology and behavior itself-even when we recognize that duality as merely discursive, and especially in light of the massive complexity of the phenomenon that this duality tries to model. While this point elicits yawns from undergraduates, who are subjected to it again and again, we wish to repeat it here. Maintaining a simple duality of biology and behavior is simply not scientifically or philosophically responsible, and as clinicians and researchers (whether behavior analytic or not) guided by the super-ordinate principles of scientific method and pragmatism, we ought to articulate, carefully and consistently, a more rigorous view of their interactive union. Such a view does not exclude exposing the fallacies of the reigning biologism. But beyond these excesses, a more healthy dialogue, 1 Correspondence related to this article may be sent to gholman@u.washington.edu.