Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do otherwise

Jeppsson, Sofia

doi:10.1007/s10677-016-9721-x

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Nevertheless, another argument can be made that they did not. It has been argued, to my mind convincingly, that 'reason' (like 'ought') implies 'can' (Haji 2012;Streumer 2007;Jeppsson 2016). If a child is drowning on the other side of the world, I do not have a reason to try and save her.…”

Section: Life Choices Iroe and Reasons-responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 84%

Irrational Option Exclusion

Jeppsson

2018

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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In this paper, I describe a hitherto overlooked kind of practical irrationality, which I call irrational option exclusion. An agent who suffers from this problem does not merely fail to act on her best judgementshe fails to realize that the superior action is even an option for her. I furthermore argue that this kind of irrationality is serious enough to undermine moral responsibility. I show that an agent suffering from this problem has compromised reasonsresponsiveness, does not really express her will through action, and has a hard time doing otherwise; thus, from the standpoint of several popular moral responsibility theories, we ought to conclude that her responsibility is at the very least diminished. Keywords Moral responsibility. Reasons-responsiveness. Ability to do otherwise. Quality of will. Practical irrationality In this paper, I will describe a hitherto overlooked kind of practical irrationality, which I call irrational option exclusion. An agent is practically irrational when she fails to do what she judges best. This is not always responsibility undermining; it is widely agreed that agents can be responsible for akratic acts. But an agent who suffers from irrational option exclusion does not merely fail to act on her best judgementshe fails to realize that the superior action is even an option for her. I will argue that when an agent's rational thinking is compromised in this way, her moral responsibility is compromised as welland this is so, regardless of which moral responsibility theory we adopt. 1 The Milgram Obedience Experiments: The Case of Mr. Braverman For a first illustration of the phenomenon, let us take a look at the much discussed Milgram obedience experiments (Milgram 1974/2010). Prima facie, experiments such as Milgram's seem

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Section: Life Choices Iroe and Reasons-responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 84%

Irrational Option Exclusion

Jeppsson

2018

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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“…The ultimate plausibility of this claim turns on whether the outcomes of our actions are determined before we choose to act and whether agents can have normative reasons in favor of or against actions they are already determined to perform (see, e.g. Haji 2012;Jeppsson 2016). In this article, I assume that the outcomes of our actions are not determined before we choose to act.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A portable defense of the Procreation Asymmetry

Earl

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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The Procreation Asymmetry holds that we have strong moral reasons not to create miserable people for their own sakes, but no moral reasons to create happy people for their own sakes. To defend this conjunction against an argument that it leads to inconsistency, I show how recognizing ‘creation’ as a temporally extended process allows us to revise the conjuncts in a way that preserves their intuitive force. This defense of the Procreation Asymmetry is preferable to others because it does not require us to take on controversial metaphysical or metaethical commitments – in other words, it has the theoretical virtue of portability.

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“…Whether it is even in principle possible to accurately and reliably predict someone's behaviour while also continuously informing him about the predictions made is controversial (see Bok 1998: 81-87 for the argument that it is not). If it were possible, it is far from obvious how this kind of knowledge would affect agents; perhaps not much at all, because as long as our actions depend on our thoughts and intentions we will still have to think things through and decide what to do (Korsgaard 1996b: 94-96;Jeppsson 2016Jeppsson : 1235. Perhaps there is no reason to care about one's manipulation, even when one knows where it will lead.…”

Section: Plum 2's Decisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The agential perspective: a hard-line reply to the four-case manipulation argument

Jeppsson

2019

Philos Stud

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One of the most influential arguments against compatibilism is Derk Pereboom's four-case manipulation argument. Professor Plum, the main character of the thought experiment, is manipulated into doing what he does; he therefore supposedly lacks moral responsibility for his action. Since he is arguably analogous to an ordinary agent under determinism, Pereboom concludes that ordinary determined agents lack moral responsibility as well. I offer a hard-line reply to this argument, that is, a reply which denies that this kind of manipulation is responsibility undermining. I point out that fully fleshed-out manipulated characters in fiction can seem morally responsible for what they do. This is plausibly because we identify with such characters, and therefore focus on their options and the reasons for which they act rather than the manipulation. I further argue that we ought to focus this way when interacting with other agents. We have no reason to trust the incompatibilist intuitions that arise when we regard manipulated agents from a much more detached perspective.

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Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do otherwise

Cited by 7 publications

References 12 publications

Irrational Option Exclusion

Irrational Option Exclusion

A portable defense of the Procreation Asymmetry

The agential perspective: a hard-line reply to the four-case manipulation argument

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