Reasons and Experience

Millar, Alan

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242703.001.0001

Cited by 80 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…9 9 Compare Millar (1991, pp. 61–62), who suggests that “inferential competence” involves having appropriate “habits of belief management,” and Pollock and Cruz (1999, pp.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Normative Force of Reasoning

Wedgwood¹

2006

Nous

104

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…9 9 Compare Millar (1991, pp. 61–62), who suggests that “inferential competence” involves having appropriate “habits of belief management,” and Pollock and Cruz (1999, pp.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Normative Force of Reasoning

Wedgwood¹

2006

Nous

104

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…For example, Dretske (2002) argues that we don't have to know that something is an armadillo (and thus use the concept of armadillo) to see an armadillo on the road, but he is not so sure about the possibility of seeing an armadillo on the road without knowing that it is an animal (and thus having the concept of "animal"). Along somewhat similar lines Millar (1991) argues that we cannot perceive a pumpkin without a corresponding concept.…”

Section: Two Problems Of Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Concepts as soft detectors – On the role concepts play in perception

Grabarczyk

2016

New Ideas in Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

a b s t r a c tThe idea that concepts play a significant role in some perceptions is widespread but everybody seems to differ as to where to draw the line. Some researchers say that the difference between direct and indirect, concept driven acts of perception manifests itself whenever we perceive abstract or general properties. Others point at second order properties or causal properties. I call this inability to precisely differentiate between acts of direct and indirect perception "The Division Problem". Furthermore there is always a question as to how widespread indirect perceptions are. Can we attribute them to prelingual cognitive systems? I call this second problem "The Distribution Problem". The main aim of the paper is providing a solution to both problems by proposing a naturalistic explication of the notion of "concept". I propose to identify the role concepts were supposed to play in perception with a mechanism of "soft detection". Unlike hard detectors which react to a specific target in virtue of their constitution and placement in the system, soft detectors are understood as dynamic categorization devices enabling the cognitive system to selectively react to an undetectable property via flexible exploitation of data from hard detectors. I conclude by showing how the notion of soft detection retains some of the aspects traditionally attributed to concepts and how does it differ from similar accounts known from contemporary literature.

show abstract

“…Regress arguments have been taken to require us to explain justified belief in cases of perceptual knowledge in terms of sensory experiences and accordingly either to sever justified belief from the possession of reasons (Pryor 2002) or posit a special class of reasons that are constituted by experience (as I did in Millar 1991). On the view I am proposing here there is no need for these maneuvers because we are no longer seeking to explain knowledge in terms of justified belief.…”

Section: Reconciliation? 11mentioning

confidence: 97%

What is it that Cognitive Abilities are Abilities to Do?

Millar

2009

Acta Anal

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article outlines a conception of perceptual-recognitional abilities. These include abilities to recognize certain things from their appearance to some sensory modality, as being of some kind, or as possessing some property, or as being some specified individual. An assumption of the article is that these abilities are crucial for an adequate understanding of perceptual knowledge. The specific aim here is to contrast those abilities with abilities or competences as conceived in the virtue-theoretic literature, with particular reference to views of Ernest Sosa and John Greco. In the course of the discussion, it is emphasized that the notion of exercising a perceptual-recognitional ability is a success notion: exercising such an ability is nothing less than acquiring knowledge. Even so, the view can make sense of our fallibility. It can also be defended in the face of an objection stemming from consideration of what are here called success-rate abilities

show abstract

Reasons and Experience

Cited by 80 publications

References 0 publications

The Normative Force of Reasoning

The Normative Force of Reasoning

Concepts as soft detectors – On the role concepts play in perception

What is it that Cognitive Abilities are Abilities to Do?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About