Reasoning and pragmatics

Politzer, Guy; Macchi, Laura

doi:10.1007/bf02512230

Cited by 34 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…A broad paradigm of taking semantic and pragmatic factors into account when analysing reasoning behaviour has been advocated by Stenning and van Lambalgen (2001. Recently, Politzer (2004) (and see also Politzer and Macchi 2002) has lain out arguments for the necessity of both a macroanalysis and a microanalysis of the semantic structure of experimental tasks. The latter term is Politzer's label for precisely what we hope to achieve in the current study: based on pragmatic theory, the aim of the microanalysis is to output "the determination of the interpretation of the premises, conclusion or question which the participant is likely to work out."…”

Section: Premises In Everyday Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

‘if p then q’ . . . and all that: Logical Elements in Reasoning and Discourse

Counihan

2008

J of Log Lang and Inf

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Section: Premises In Everyday Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

‘if p then q’ . . . and all that: Logical Elements in Reasoning and Discourse

Counihan

2008

J of Log Lang and Inf

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“…The exchange between subject and predicate is likely to suggest a change in topic (as opposed to focus): Asserting some Q are P instead of some P are Q may definitely alter the point of an argument so that participants (even among those who are aware of their logical equivalence) may be reluctant to accept the inference of I to I′ and E to E′. Participants who represent the task as an inquiry about common sense reasoning (rather than about formal logic) are likely to be sensitive to such pragmatic determinants of sentence comprehension (Politzer, 1997(Politzer, , 2004aPolitzer & Macchi, 2000). In summary, the inference task requires more processing than just a semantic appreciation of the quantified sentences; the task often allows for a range of interpretations.…”

Section: To What Extent Is the Inference Task Relevant?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Interpretation of Classically Quantified Sentences: A Set-Theoretic Approach

et al. 2006

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We present a set-theoretic model of the mental representation of classically quantified sentences (All P are Q, Some P are Q, Some P are not Q, and No P are Q). We take inclusion, exclusion, and their negations to be primitive concepts. We show that although these sentences are known to have a diagrammatic expression (in the form of the Gergonne circles) that constitutes a semantic representation, these concepts can also be expressed syntactically in the form of algebraic formulas. We hypothesized that the quantified sentences have an abstract underlying representation common to the formulas and their associated sets of diagrams (models). We derived 9 predictions (3 semantic, 2 pragmatic, and 4 mixed) regarding people's assessment of how well each of the 5 diagrams expresses the meaning of each of the quantified sentences. We report the results from 3 experiments using Gergonne's (1817) circles or an adaptation of Leibniz (1903Leibniz ( / 1988 lines as external representations and show them to support the predictions.

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“…It is clear that a judgment can be deemed to have been made in accordance with some principle only to the extent that the interpretation of the problem statement and of the question made by the participant and the experimenter coincide. This approach to the experimental study of thinking and reasoning, often called "conversational approach", has been suggested or applied by a number of researchers (Adler 1991, Hilton 1995, Macchi 2000, Politzer 1986and 1991, Politzer and Macchi 2000, Schwarz 1996. It is quite general and can change our understanding of some tasks radically (see Sperber et al 1995 for Wason's selection task).…”

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confidence: 99%

Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism

Baratgin

Politzer

2006

Mind & Society

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This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: An epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that the adoption of this framework has two kinds of implications. The first one regards the methodology of the experimental study of probability judgment. The Bayesian framework creates pragmatic constraints on the methodology that are linked to the interpretation of, and the belief in, the information presented, or referred to, by an experimenter in order for it to be the basis of a probability judgment by individual participants. It is shown that these constraints have not been satisfied in the past, and the question of whether they can be satisfied in principle is raised and answered negatively. The second kind of implications consists of two limitations in the scope of the Bayesian model. They regard (i) the background of revision (the Bayesian model considers only revising situations but not updating situations), and (ii) the notorious case of the null priors. In both cases Lewis' rule is an appropriate alternative to Bayes' rule, but its use faces the same operational difficulties.Keywords Probability judgment • Subjective Bayesianism • Bayesian coherence • Probability revising • Probability updating • Linguistic pragmatics 2 IntroductionIn the imposing literature devoted to the psychological study of probability judgment, the use of a theoretical model as a referential norm for "rational" behavior is a usual methodology.1 Since the pioneering study by Rouanet (1961), and following the famous article by Edwards et al. (1963), the Bayesian model of probability has been the most frequently used as a normative reference or as a possible descriptive model. The implicit question that these studies attempt to answer is whether human beings perform probability judgment in a "Bayesian" manner. These interrogations go far beyond the realm of psychology: They also apply to the various domains that use the Bayesian model, such as economics (Davis and Holt 1993), law (Callen 1982), medicine (Casscells et al. 1978), artificial intelligence (Cohen 1985) and philosophy (Stich 1990).The present paper is not directly aimed towards these important debates concerning probabilistic functioning in humans, but is rather a methodological examination of the conditions under which the Bayesian model may be used as a normative theory. In other words, it aims to find an answer to the following question: Does the psychological literature take into consideration the various implications and constraints imposed by the usage of the Bayesian model as a normative reference? It will be argued that the answer is negative, an...

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Reasoning and pragmatics

Abstract: pragmatics, reasoning, deduction, conditional reasoning, judgment, probabilistic reasoning,

Cited by 34 publications

References 26 publications

‘if p then q’ . . . and all that: Logical Elements in Reasoning and Discourse

‘if p then q’ . . . and all that: Logical Elements in Reasoning and Discourse

The Interpretation of Classically Quantified Sentences: A Set-Theoretic Approach

Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism

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