Realizing what might be

Willer, Malte

doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9514-3

Cited by 2 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…14 12 It is a theorem in the two different logics suggested by Schulz and Willer. 13 As far as I can see, this is indeed the case in the semantics advocated by Willer (2011) at the end of his paper. 14 There may be a sense in which this inference is not as bad as it looks and which may explain why someone could be tempted to take it as valid.…”

Section: Blurring the Significance Of Epistemic Necessitymentioning

confidence: 81%

Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer

Schulz

2011

Philos Stud

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A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367-386, 2010) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365-375, 2011) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer's argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and show that accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic necessitations.Keywords Indicative conditionals Á Epistemic modals Á Modalised conditionals Á Suppositional view Conditionals and epistemic modalsThe debates about conditionals and epistemic modals display various structural similarities. Positions of the same type have been advanced in both domains. There are contextualist theories of indicative conditionals and corresponding theories of epistemic modals. 1 More recently, there are also relativist theories of indicative conditionals supplementing the relativist theories of epistemic modals. 2 In the

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Section: Blurring the Significance Of Epistemic Necessitymentioning

confidence: 81%

Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer

Schulz

2011

Philos Stud

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“…And, for conditional 'might'-sentences, the 10. The interesting view sketched in Willer (2011) and developed in Willer (2013) is dynamic. But…”

Section: The Consistency Checking Theory Of 'Might'mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first is the dynamic or expressivist version of the modal restrictor‐inspired account of indicative conditionals—given by Willer () and Yalcin () . These theorists view the antecedent of a conditional as a restrictor on a modal consequent .…”

Section: Conditional ‘Might'‐sentencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The interesting view sketched in Willer () and developed in Willer () is dynamic. But Willer conceives of information states in a non‐standard way, which allows the update by a ‘might'‐sentence to be more than simply a check for consistency.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We evaluate a conditional at a world in the context set by seeing whether the consequent is true in the subset of worlds accessible from that world in which the antecedent is true. On the views of Yalcin () and Willer (), there is only one level of modal displacement—we simply restrict the worlds in the context set that we are testing. The reason for the difference in indicative conditionals springs from the difference in how the authors treat epistemic modals generally—with Kratzer, but not Yalcin and Willer, treating modal statements as factual.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Taking ‘Might'‐Communication Seriously

Lennertz

2014

Philosophical Books

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Realizing what might be

Cited by 2 publications

References 12 publications

Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer

Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer

Taking ‘Might'‐Communication Seriously

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