Realization in biology?

Abstract

It is widely assumed that functional and dispositional properties are not identical to their physical base, but that there is some kind of asymmetrical ontological dependence between them. In this regard, a popular idea is that the former are realized by the latter, which, under the non-identity assumption, is generally understood to be a non-causal, constitutive relation. In this paper we examine two of the most widely accepted approaches to realization, the so-called 'flat view' and the 'dimensioned view', and we analyze their explanatory relevance in the light of a number of examples from the life sciences, paying special attention to developmental phenomena. Our conclusion is that the emphasis placed by modern-day biology on such properties as variability, evolvability, and a whole collection of phenomena like modularity, robustness, and developmental constraint or developmental bias requires the adoption of a much more dynamic perspective than traditional realization frameworks are able to capture.

The multiple realization of human color vision revisited

“…Why, one might ask, do we need the complicated schema Aizawa and Gillett offer (see below) in order to understand such a simple bit of science as the dipole 8 One important feature this schema understates is how the powers of realized and realizer properties may be qualitatively distinct (see Gillett, 2002). 9 Balari and Lorenzo (2019), make a cryptic claim about the schema for Dimensioned realization. They write, Dimensioned realization "does not really go beyond telling us when and that (multiple) realization occurs, but falls short when it comes to explaining why or how some asymmetric dependence exists between entities at different levels" (Balari and Lorenzo, 2019, p. 5).…”

“…These words are illustrative, because they suggest that Aizawa and Gillett are here disregarding what counts as the same or different in the sciences, in molecular biology in this case. They appear not to be at all impressed by the fact that biologists and biochemists consider these proteins homologous and have developed their methods to determine homologies at this (and other) levels ( Balari and Lorenzo, 2019 , p. 18).…”

“… Balari and Lorenzo (2019) offer a bold criticism of Aizawa and Gillett’s applied work. In a section of their paper labeled “The dismissal of scientific practice,” Balari and Lorenzo claim that Aizawa and Gillett “actually ignore scientific practice.” Although they aim their fire at Aizawa and Gillett’s handling of long-term potentiation (LTP), one can easily see how their concern would extend to the discussion of human color vision.…”

“…Concerning color vision, they write, "the example of variations in human cone opsins does not make for concrete direct evidence of actual multiple realization of a psychological capacity" [Polger and Shapiro (2016), p. 110]. Balari and Lorenzo (2019) offer a bold criticism of Aizawa and Gillett's applied work. In a section of their paper labeled "The dismissal of scientific practice, " Balari and Lorenzo claim that Aizawa and Gillett "actually ignore scientific practice."…”

“… 9 Balari and Lorenzo (2019) , make a cryptic claim about the schema for Dimensioned realization. They write, Dimensioned realization “does not really go beyond telling us when and that (multiple) realization occurs, but falls short when it comes to explaining why or how some asymmetric dependence exists between entities at different levels” ( Balari and Lorenzo, 2019 , p. 5).…”