Realistic Threat Models for Satellite-Based Quantum Key Distribution

Ghalaii, Masoud; Bahrani, Sima; Liorni, Carlo; Grasselli, Federico; Kampermann, Hermann; Wooltorton, Lewis; Kumar, Rupesh; Pirandola, Stefano; Spiller, Timothy P.; Ling, Alexander; Hüttner, B.; Razavi, Mohsen

doi:10.48550/arxiv.2212.04807

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…In this work, the ground-station altitude is denoted as h 0 , the satellite zenith angle at the ground station is denoted as θ z , and the satellite altitude at θ z = 0 is denoted as H. The channel distance can then be given by L = (H − h 0 )/ cos θ z . We assume a restricted eavesdropping scenario where the channel is monitored [25], and hence Eve is passive and not able to perform an active attack [38]. However, as indicated in figure 2, we allow Eve to capture all the lost light.…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Classical-quantum dual encoding for laser communications in space

Winnel,

Wang,

Malaney

et al. 2024

New J. Phys.

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In typical laser communications classical information is encoded by modulating the amplitude of the laser beam and measured via direct detection. We add a layer of security using quantum physics to this standard scheme, applicable to free-space channels. We consider a simultaneous classical-quantum communication scheme where the classical information is encoded in the usual way and the quantum information is encoded as fluctuations of a sub-Poissonian noise-floor. For secret key generation, we consider a continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol (CVQKD) using a Gaussian ensemble of squeezed states and direct detection. Under the assumption of passive attacks secure key generation and classical communication can proceed simultaneously. Compared with standard CVQKD. which is secure against unrestricted attacks, our added layer of quantum security is simple to implement, robust and does not affect classical data rates. We perform detailed simulations of the performance of the protocol for a free-space atmospheric channel. We analyse security of the CVQKD protocol in the composable finite-size regime.

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Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike fibre links, the direct line-of-sight link can be monitored by the trusted parties, meaning the eavesdropper (Eve) has limited access to the channel. As a result the only plausible attack on an LCS system is a passive one in which lost light is intercepted by the eavesdropper [25,26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%