Real-Time Streaming Data Delivery over Named Data Networking

Abstract

SUMMARY Named Data Networking (NDN) is a proposed future Internet architecture that shifts the fundamental abstraction of the network from host-to-host communication to request-response for named, signed data-an information dissemination focused approach. This paper describes a general design for receiver-driven, real-time streaming data (RTSD) applications over the current NDN implementation that aims to take advantage of the architecture's unique affordances. It is based on experimental development and testing of running code for real-time video conferencing, a positional tracking system for interactive multimedia, and a distributed control system for live performance. The design includes initial approaches to minimizing latency, managing buffer size and Interest retransmission, and adapting retrieval to maximize bandwidth and control congestion. Initial implementations of these approaches are evaluated for functionality and performance results, and the potential for future research in this area, and improved performance as new features of the architecture become available, is discussed.

A Countermeasure Approach for Brute-Force Timing Attacks on Cache Privacy in Named Data Networking Architectures

“…The video distribution applications benefit from the NDN architecture. The live streaming tools (NDNlive, NDNvideo, and NDN-RTC) and prerecorded and live stream tools (NDNtube) were proposed by [20][21][22][23]. Instead of relying on centralized servers as it is constructed with current streaming applications, the NDN design may make the servers robust by naming the streaming packets, which can be retrieved from the network layer, independently.…”

“…Through NDN, the applications fetch the streamed content by name, and the content can be delivered either by the producer or by any router's CS. That also removes the third-party application requirements of managing and locating streamed contents, as designed in NDNtube [22] and video-conferencing applications [23].…”

“…In the NDN side-channel attack, the scope of the attack may vary by the intention of an adversary and be targeted to a specific streaming application (e.g., NDNtube [22], NDNlive [22], NDNvideo [20], and NDN-RTC [21]). Based on the CRT values, information privacy can be threatened by the adversary, as described by [1,2,6].…”