Reactance as a function of actual versus projected autonomy.

Baer, Robert; Hinkle, Steve; Smith, Karen; Fenton, Marsha

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.38.3.416

Cited by 47 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Second, this discrepancy enlargement seems to operate in the service of a discrepancy-reducing system. That is, we probably don't reassert our freedom for no particular reason, but rather we do so in order to maintain an image of ourselves (or a public image of ourselves---d. Baer, Hinkle, Smith, & Fenton, 1980;Brounstein, Ostrove, & Mills, 1979) as people who can't be pushed around. This is quite consistent with the reasoning that positive feedback loops, to be adaptive, must ultimately benefit superordinate negative feedback loops.…”

Section: Reactancementioning

confidence: 99%

Attention and Self-Regulation

Carver¹,

Scheier²

1981

1,960

359

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Preface "Seek simplicity and distrust it." Alfred North Whitehead "It will become all too clear that an ability to see patterns in behavior, an ability that some might feel proud of, can lead more easily to a wrong description than a right one." William T. PowersThe goal of the theorist-the scholar-is to take a collection of observations of the world, and perceive order in them. This process necessarily imposes an artificial simplicity upon those observations. That is, specific observations are weighed differently from each other whenever a theoretical account is abstracted from raw experiences. Some observed events are misunderstood or distorted, others are seen as representing random fluctuations and are ignored, and yet others are viewed as centrally important. This abstraction and oversimplification of reality is inevitable in theory construction. Moreover, the abstracted vision builds upon itself. That is, as a structure begins to emerge from continued observation, the structure itself guides the search for new information. The result is a construction that is more elaborate than what existed before, but it still is usually simpler than reality.It is important for scholars to believe in the value of their task, and in the general correctness of the vision that guides their work. This commitment, and the hope of progress that follows from it, make it possible to continue even when the work is difficult and slow. But there is a special danger here, a danger that should not be discounted. The theorist must always be reluctant to believe that the vision is complete, that it is wholly accurate. Simplification makes reality intelligible. But the appeal of simplicity can blind one to the evidence that reality provides. And it is still reality that we are trying to describe. No matter how pretty the picture, it is of no use unless it has a reasonably good fit with reality. These points are applicable to any field of scientific endeavor. But writing this book has made us particularly sensitive to their implications for the analysis of human behavior. The planning of this book began with a very simple goal. We were going to describe a research program in which we had been engaged, and discuss its relationship to closely related work that had been conducted by others. Very quickly, however, the project began to escape its initial boundaries. In effect, the picture that existed in our minds of how self-regulation works began to guide a search for new information. That new information led in tum to a more elaborated model of reality. The result of these changes in perspective is a volume that in viii Preface certain ways is considerably more ambitious in scope than was its original conception. From a relatively simple (and safe) research monograph, the book has evolved into a more complex (and riskier) statement about behavioral self-regulation in general: we are arguing, in fact, for the viability of a model of self-regulation that departs considerably from traditional models.In making this statement about self-regulati...

show abstract

Section: Reactancementioning

confidence: 99%

Attention and Self-Regulation

Carver¹,

Scheier²

1981

1,960

359

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Even though Expt 2 failed to produce informational anticonformity, it should be noted that other types of anticonformity-that is anticonformity based on other motives-has been found in numerous studies (e.g. Baer, Hinkle, Smith & Fenton, 1980;Brehm & Mann, 1975; Chu, 1979;Cooper & Jones, 1969;Frager, 1970;Wallace etal., 1983;Weir, cited in Snyder & Fromkin, 1980, pp. 48-50;Willis & Hollander, 1964).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 91%

Social influence and the diamond model of social response: Toward an extended theory of informational influence

Nail

Ruch

1992

British J Social Psychol

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to the diamond model of social response (Nail, 1989;Willis, 1965). a bidimensional response space is necessary to provide for the possible responses in social influence settings. Experiment 1 tested diamond model predictions in a context that simulated social influence processes. Evidence was found for each of the responses postulated by the diamond model: conformity, anticonformity, independence and self-anticonformity, The aksmiptiw constructs of the diamond model were shown to correspond to an extended version of the expfanatory constructs of Deutsch & Gerard's (1955) theory of informational influence. Experiment 2 tested this extended theory in a setting with greater experimental realism than Expt 1. Interestingly, Expt 2 found evidence for informational influence: conformity, independence and self-anticonformity, but not informational anticonformity. Overall, the data support the bidimensional diamond model over any of the competing unidimensional formulations.* Requests for reprints. Paul R. Nail and Gregory Lynn Rurhthe diamond model can be viewed as a synthesis of the nonconformity-conformity and independence-conformity models. Like the nonconformity-conformity model, the diamond model requires the degree of agreement between the target and source be assessed after each influence trial. Yet, like the independence-conformity model, the degree of movement by the target on each trial must also be assessed. Nail (1989) demonstrated that with respect to operational definitions, the diamond model is really nothing more than a Cartesian plane as used in secondary school mathematics classes. In his reformulated version of the model, absolute movement scores are plotted on the horizontal x-axis and net agreement scores are plotted on the vertical y-axis. The result is a diamond-like response space, with conformity, independence, anticonformity, and self-anticonformity falling at the apices.According to the logic of the diamond model, just as anticonformity is the opposite of conformity, self-anticonformity is the opposite of independence. With conformity and anticonformity, the group is the source of reference, and in the pure forms, the person behaves so as to end up in either complete agreement or disagreement, respectively, with the group. With pure independence and pure self-anticonformity, in contrast, the source of reference is the Jeg, and the person behaves so as to end up in either complete agreement or disagreement, respectively, with the self.Even though the diamond model provides a more refined conceptualization of conformity and its alternatives than competing models, it has never been widely accepted or utilized as a model for research (Chu, 1979;and Wallace, Becker, Coppel & Cox, 1983 are rare exceptions). There are probably several reasons for this lack of acceptance, but one is undoubtedly the Willis-Nail notion of self-anticonformity. One problem with self-anticonformity is that contrary to the other diamond model responses, it does not seem intuitively reasonable. Moreover, Willis neve...

show abstract

“…Such assertion is especially pronounced when it is another person's overt influence that seems to threaten one's range of options. (Baer et al 1980, Dillard & Pfau 2002. In other words, targets of social pressure may meet those efforts not just with indifference, but with outright opposition-a "boomerang effect".…”

Section: Research On Feedback and 'Intrinsic' Motivationmentioning

confidence: 98%

Moral Feedback and Motivation: Revisiting the Undermining Effect

Springer

2008

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Social psychologists have evidence that evaluative feedback on others' choices sometimes has unwelcome negative effects on hearers' motivation. Holroyd's article (Holroyd J. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 10:267-278, 2007) draws attention to one such result, the undermining effect, that should help to challenge moral philosophers' complacency about blame and praise. The cause for concern is actually greater than she indicates, both because there are multiple kinds of negative effect on hearer motivation, and because these are not, as she hopes, reliably counteracted by implicit features of praise and blame. The communicative ideal that she articulates does point us in the right direction, but it requires further elaboration. Once it is spelled out, we find that realizing this ideal, in light of the empirical research, requires rethinking the role of verdict-like judgments within moral feedback.Most moral philosophers seem to be complacent about the workings of praise and blame. We commonly use terms such as "wrong" and "blameworthy" interchangeably, and take discovery of someone's blameworthy (or praiseworthy) behavior as sufficient grounds for blaming (or praising). Social psychologists are likely to demur. The effects of praise, blame, and other social responses are complex. The practical consequences of an evaluative interaction depend not only on the fit between a moral claim and the character or action it concerns, but also on situational details, including who evaluates and how. Researchers are apt to insist that the wisdom of initiating a particular critical response cannot be determined in abstraction from its likely effects.Unfortunately, some moral philosophers have acquired a distaste for worrying about effects, perhaps drawn to a version of Strawson's view (1974) that expressive

show abstract

Reactance as a function of actual versus projected autonomy.

Cited by 47 publications

References 10 publications

Attention and Self-Regulation

Attention and Self-Regulation

Social influence and the diamond model of social response: Toward an extended theory of informational influence

Moral Feedback and Motivation: Revisiting the Undermining Effect

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About