Re-evaluating the post-communist success story: party elite loyalty, citizen mobilization and the erosion of Hungarian democracy

Abstract

In light of the instability of several Central Eastern European democracies following their accession to the European Union, most dramatically embodied by the ‘constitutional revolution’ taking place in Hungary since April 2010, this paper offers a critical reading of the dominant, rational-institutionalist model of democratic consolidation. Drawing on the Hungarian case, it argues that the conditions set out by this model are insufficient for ensuring a democratic regime against erosion. On this basis, the paper considers additional elements to understand Fidesz’s reforms: the importance of deeper commitments to democracy among the leadership of mainstream parties, and the pivotal role of party strategies of citizen mobilization in the consolidation of young democracies. Drawing on these insights, the paper argues for approaching democratic consolidation as an agent-led process of cultural change, emphasizing the socializing role of mainstream parties’ strategies of mobilization in the emergence of a democratic political culture. The last section concludes with methodological and empirical considerations, outlining a three-fold agenda for future research.

Democratic Partisanship: From Theoretical Ideal to Empirical Standard

“…within society for a democratic regime to be sustained over time (Hall and Taylor 1996;Plattner and Diamond 1996;Miller, White, and Heywood 1997;Dryzek and Holmes 2002;Herman 2016). …”

“…In this case, democracy's formalized rules and procedures are also far more vulnerable and susceptible to being undermined (Herman 2016). …”

RADICAL PARTY SYSTEM CHANGES IN FIVE EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES: EUROSCEPTIC AND POPULIST PARTIES ON THE MOVE IN THE 2010s

“…Moreover, in this system of "crony capitalism" (The Economist, 2014) they have organized their own special pseudo-civil society from above as well. All of the NMS have suffered from very weak social embeddedness (Casal Bértoa, 2014), hence the emergence of socially and ideologically unanchored elites organized by political and economic oligarchs (Herman, 2015). However, as recent analyses have pointed out, these Golem parties have created an effective countrywide corruption network based on public procurement and EU transfers.…”

“…civic political culture) have also been mentioned in several papers as well-being, life-satisfaction or social progress, i.e. those factors closely interwoven with social investment, social productivity and the like (Herman, 2015). character of populism, the prevalence of extremism, and the popularity of protest parties.…”

Corrigenda

“…From the massive collection of Western mainstream literature on populism, see Barr (2009), Chwalisz (2015, Degan-Krause and Haughton (2009), Giusto et al (2013), Haughton (2014), Herman (2015), Kessels (2015), Krastev (2007), Kriesi (2014), Kriesi and Pappas (2015), Laclau (2007), Ladrech (2014), Lewis (2014), Mair (2002), Mény and Surel (2002), Mudde (2002, Painter (2013), Pytlas (2016), Rupnik (2007a,b), Wolinetz andZaslove (2016), andWoods (2014). The academic history of populism since the late 1960s has been presented by .…”