Re-enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford

Abstract

In this article, against the background of a notion of 'assembled' truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as 'naturalised realism' is outlined. Naturalised realism is 'fallibilist' in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford's anti-realist 'new induction' threats by showing that 'explanationism' and his 'epistemic instrumentalism' are just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive-and under-determination-based anti-realist arguments.Keywords: Realism, evolutionary progressiveness, continuity, reference, truth, unconceived alternatives IntroductionIn this article a new version of realism in science is outlined that does more justice to our current understanding of the functioning of science and its history than either traditional scientific realism or instrumentalism can do. The proposed version of realism, referred to as 'naturalised realism', is 'fallibilist' in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. This view may sound like a pessimistic meta-inductivist's dream, but actually this is so only if one evaluates it from within a traditional no-miracles kind of realism. Naturalised realism highlights some of the limitations of dealing with issues of realism in a traditional 'nomiracles' (Putnam 1975, 73), or 'explanationist' (Stanford 2006, context within which approximate truth is presented as the reason for the success of science. Specifically it is shown here that one of the most notable recent attacks on explanationist realism, namely Kyle Stanford's new induction argument, is powerful specifically because he works within explanationist assumptions. Naturalised realism turns on a complex evolutionary view of scientific progress within which Stanford's anti-realist threats are disarmed, not only because of approaching such threats in 2 non-explanationist terms, but mainly because 'explanationism' and Stanford's 'epistemic instrumentalism' are shown to be just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and realism.The article is set out as follows: In section 2 the framework of the current realist/anti-realist debate is briefly set out. This section does not give a full evaluation of explanationism (or of other versions of realism) or even of possible explanationist answers to naturalised realism. The focus is rather on outlining points of difference between some core features of explanationism and those of naturalise...

Problems with Using Evolutionary Theory in Philosophy

“…Ruttkamp-Bloem (2013) claims that evolutionary theory goes well with her view that present theories have true theoretical constituents. By contrast, Wray (2011) claims that evolutionary theory goes well with his view that present theories will be discarded.…”

“…Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem (2013) claims that evolutionary theory goes along with her view that present theories are (approximately) true, while K. Brad Wray claims that it goes along with his view that present theories will be discarded. Stathis Psillos (1999) and Bas van Fraassen (1980) invoke evolutionary theory to give, respectively, a realist explanation and an antirealist explanation of the success of science.…”

Reality in a Few Thermodynamic Reference Frames: Statistical Thermodynamics From Boltzmann via Gibbs to Einstein

“… Scientific realism is the generic term.  One or more scientific domains, theories, parts of theories, and even only statements are or can be selected according some criteria as more or less realistic unlike others of the same kind: "Defenders of this form of realism typically separate theories into components or aspects according to some criterion such as structure or core descriptions or what have you and argue that only the selected components are eligible for realist claims, while components not thus selected (so-called 'idle' components) may be 'false' or 'non-referring', or simply 'idle' for whatever reason, without any serious implications for realism" [1].  Being "realistic" most often means to be represented rather successfully by certain relevant models in the item(s) at issue.…”

Critiques of Axiological Realism and Surrealism

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