Re-embodying Technoscientific Fantasies: Posthumanism, Genetically Modified Foods, and the Colonization of Life

Didur, Jill

doi:10.1353/cul.2003.0021

Cited by 21 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…How does this inflection of posthumanism gel with other typologies of the posthuman terrain? Self‐labelled versions of critical posthumanism (eg Badmington, 2003; Thacker, 2003; Didur, 2003; Rossini, 2006) that partly resemble the aforementioned ecologically inflected posthumanism have served as modes of distancing from what may be seen as naively techno‐celebratory accounts of the posthuman. This is Thacker's two‐way distinction between what he terms on the one hand as ‘extropianism’ (more commonly referred to as transhumanism) and on the other a wide range of critical posthumanisms which ‘offer a more rigorous, politically and socially rooted body of work .…”

Section: Mapping the Posthumanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Genomic Natures Read through Posthumanisms

Twine¹

2010

The Sociological Review

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Section: Mapping the Posthumanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Genomic Natures Read through Posthumanisms

Twine¹

2010

The Sociological Review

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“…76 Jonathan Murdoch has further recognized the need to develop a more critically reflexive and 'humanised posthumanism' that 'situates reflexive emancipatory impulses within heterogeneous matrices'. 77 In yet another example -namely Neil Badmington's 78 collaborative exchange with leading posthumanist theorists in geography -critical posthumanism is mentioned as a theoretical stance, albeit only in connection to the work of Didur 79 ; however, Didur's work itself only defers to the works of Haraway 80 and Hayles, 81 neither of which have developed a critical account of posthumanism. Finally, while Lorimer does not develop a unified critical posthumanist theoretical disposition, he nevertheless makes a key connection between the deconstructive, ontological, and political tendencies of posthuman thought that mark the beginnings of what is later developed into a critical posthumanist framework.…”

Section: Geography and Critical Posthumanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a critical posthuman geography

Falcon

2022

cultural geographies

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Geographical analyses of posthuman thought have called for the need to develop a critical form of posthumanism that neither rehashes the pitfalls of humanism, nor promulgates a universalized and ungrounded subject position. This article demonstrates how recent advances in critical posthumanism work to address the limitations of posthuman thought by offering a unified philosophical framework that situates knowledge claims and reimagines human subjectivity and human-nonhuman relations. Critical posthumanism not only synthesizes several of the political, methodological, and philosophical strands of posthuman thought that geographers and philosophers have drawn out, but it also foregrounds an affirmative ethico-political ethos toward a historical moment characterized by socioecological injustices, intersectional inequalities, and advanced capitalist economic systems. By separating itself from transhumanist and epochal forms of posthumanism, critical posthumanism offers cultural geographers concentrating on human-nature relations a more philosophically rigorous, socially accountable, and critical way of approaching the stakes involved in posthumanist discussions.

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“…We simply know a human when we see one, she thinks, and unless there are exceptionally significant genetic similarities between XGMAs and humans, then we will have no reason to be confused at all. Jill Didur (2003) points out that critical posthumanists like Donna Haraway question ''the view that there was ever an originary divide between these things in the first place.'' Still others claim, as Andrew Siegel (2003) does, that XGMAs do not actually call into question much at all, since the assumption that humanness is necessary for personhood was already called into question long ago.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Moral Considerability of Invasive Transgenic Animals

Hale

2006

J Agric Environ Ethics

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ABSTRACT. The term moral considerability refers to the question of whether a being or set of beings is worthy of moral consideration. Moral considerability is most readily afforded to those beings that demonstrate the clearest relationship to rational humans, though many have also argued for and against the moral considerability of species, ecosystems, and ''lesser'' animals. Among these arguments there are at least two positions: ''environmentalist'' positions that tend to emphasize the systemic relations between species, and ''liberationist'' positions that tend to emphasize the attributes or welfare of a particular individual organism. Already, this classic conflict provides for some challenging theoretical clashes between environmentalists and animal liberationists. The question of moral considerability is complicated, however, by recent developments in genetic engineering. Some animals, like pigs and fish, have been genetically modified by humans to grow organs that can then be transplanted into humans. If environmental arguments for the moral consideration of species are correct, then we are released from our obligations to morally consider those animals that we have genetically modified, since they are by their nature always an ''invader species.'' If, instead, the welfare of the animal is of penultimate importance, then there is a case for strengthening the moral considerability of GM animals over ''naturally-occurring'' animals, since they bear a closer relationship to humans. This would appear to be an intractable problem, a ''bad marriage,'' as Mark Sagoff once proposed. This paper argues that the case of invasive transgenic animals exposes weaknesses in this classic conflict, and particularly, in the framing of this conflict. To remedy this framing problem, this paper argues for a reconceptualization of the term ''moral considerability,'' instead urging a strong distinction between moral considerability, moral relevance, and moral significance.KEY WORDS: considerability, genetic engineering, invader species, moral status, transgenic animals From this I was aroused, after I know not how long, by a rustling amidst the greenery on the other side of the stream. For a moment I could see nothing but the waving summits of the ferns and reeds. Then suddenly upon the bank of the stream appeared Something -at first I could not distinguish what it was. It bowed its round head to the water, and began to drink. Then I saw it was a man, going on all-fours like a beast. He was clothed in bluish cloth, and was of a copper-coloured hue, with black hair. It seemed that grotesque ugliness was an invariable character of these islanders. I could hear the suck of the water at his lips as he drank.

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Re-embodying Technoscientific Fantasies: Posthumanism, Genetically Modified Foods, and the Colonization of Life

Cited by 21 publications

References 7 publications

Genomic Natures Read through Posthumanisms

Genomic Natures Read through Posthumanisms

Toward a critical posthuman geography

The Moral Considerability of Invasive Transgenic Animals

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