Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited

Gordon, Steven; Katz, Jonathan

doi:10.1007/11832072_16

Cited by 129 publications

(127 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

127

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…To eliminate the on-line dealer, several schemes rely on multiple invocations of protocols for generic secure multi-party computation [11,24,1,18,4]. It is unclear whether computationally efficient protocols with suitable functionality can be designed.…”

Section: Computational Inefficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The solutions in [13,11,24,1] assume simultaneous broadcast which means that parties must decide on what value (if any) to broadcast in a given round before observing the values broadcast by other parties. The solutions of [20,21,15,14] rely on physical assumptions such as secure envelopes and ballot boxes.…”

Section: Strong Communication Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We follow the same high-level approach as in [13,11,24,1,18,19,4]. Our reconstruction protocol proceeds in a sequence of "fake" iterations followed by a single "real" iteration.…”

Section: Overview Of Our Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In most prior work [11,24,1,18], a secure multi-party computation is performed in each iteration to determine whether the given iteration should be real or fake. Instead we use the following approach, described in the 2-out-of-2 case (we omit some technical details in order to focus on the main idea): The dealer D chooses i * from the appropriate distribution in advance, at the time of sharing.…”

Section: Overview Of Our Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several works [13,11,24,1,18,19,27,26,4] have focused on designing rational secret-sharing protocols immune to the above problem. Protocols for rational secret sharing also follow from the more general results of Lepinski et al [20,21,15,14].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks

Fuchsbauer

Katz

Naccache

2010

Theory of Cryptography

Self Cite

103

152

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We propose a new methodology for rational secret sharing leading to various instantiations (in both the two-party and multi-party settings) that are simple and efficient in terms of computation, share size, and round complexity. Our protocols do not require physical assumptions or simultaneous channels, and can even be run over asynchronous, pointto-point networks.We also propose new equilibrium notions (namely, computational versions of strict Nash equilibrium and stability with respect to trembles) and prove that our protocols satisfy them. These notions guarantee, roughly speaking, that at each point in the protocol there is a unique legal message a party can send. This, in turn, ensures that protocol messages cannot be used as subliminal channels, something achieved in prior work only by making strong assumptions on the communication network.

show abstract

Section: Computational Inefficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Strong Communication Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We follow the same high-level approach as in [13,11,24,1,18,19,4]. Our reconstruction protocol proceeds in a sequence of "fake" iterations followed by a single "real" iteration.…”

Section: Overview Of Our Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Overview Of Our Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks

Fuchsbauer

Katz

Naccache

2010

Theory of Cryptography

Self Cite

103

152

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Social rational secure multi‐party computation

Wang

Liu

Wang

et al. 2013

Concurrency and Computation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

SUMMARYRational party is a new kind of parties who behave neither like honest parties nor like malicious adversaries. The crux point of rational party is the definition of the utility function, as rational parties only care about how to maximize their utility. In other words, rational parties choose the strategies, which can bring them the highest utilities. In rational secure two‐party computation protocol, the main task is how to boost mutual cooperation to complete the protocol. Social rational secure multi‐party computation (SRSMPC) means that in a social network, some distributed and rational parties with reputation properties want to jointly compute a functionality. The seemingly simple task becomes tough under three conditions. The first condition is that the network composed by parties may not be complete. That is, two parties may not be neighbors and they are connected through other parties. The second is that the network may be not secure. That is, messages may be tempered by malicious parties. The third condition is that parties may run the protocol under incomplete information scenario. That is, parties may have types and each type has a corresponding utility function. Under the first and second conditions, parties need to consider how to securely transmit messages between two parties who are not neighbors. Under the third condition, we propose the Tit‐for‐Tat strategy and prove that mutual cooperation is a sequential equilibrium between two parties. In this paper, we construct an SRSMPC protocol by using mechanism design under incomplete information to facilitate the implementation of the SRSMPC protocol within constant rounds. Meanwhile, newcomers are allowed to participate in the protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first social rational secure computation protocol for multi‐party under an incomplete information scenario and an incomplete network. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

show abstract

New rational parties relying on reputation

Wang

Liu

2013

Security Comm. Networks

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we redefine the utilities considering other parts such as reputation in order to give rational parties incentives to participate in the protocol and finally get the correct outputs. The most distinct contribution of this paper is the proposal of rational covert adversaries whose behaviors are combinations of rational parties and covert adversaries. Finally, given proper parameters, we prove that all parties have incentives to participate in the rational secure computation protocol.

show abstract

Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited

Cited by 129 publications

References 13 publications

Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks

Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks

Social rational secure multi‐party computation

New rational parties relying on reputation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About