Rational responsibility and the assertoric character of bald-faced lies

Leland, Patrick R.

doi:10.1093/analys/anv080

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…While it has been pointed out in previous work that the notion of commitment could be helpfully put to work to define lying (Marsili 2014(Marsili , pp. 165-170, 2018aLeland 2015;Viebahn 2019), I am not aware of any attempt to provide a systematic proposal in this sense. Building on previous work on assertion, I will try to fill this gap by providing a fine-grained characterisation of what assertoric commitment is, and then proceed to show how this account of commitment can be put to work to draw the right distinctions about lying.…”

Section: Definition Of Lying S Lies Iff S Asserts That P Insincerelymentioning

confidence: 99%

Lying, speech acts, and commitment

Marsili

2020

Synthese

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Not every speech act can be a lie. A good definition of lying should be able to draw the right distinctions between speech acts (like promises, assertions, and oaths) that can be lies and speech acts (like commands, suggestions, or assumptions) that under no circumstances are lies. This paper shows that no extant account of lying is able to draw the required distinctions. It argues that a definition of lying based on the notion of ‘assertoric commitment’ can succeed where other accounts have failed. Assertoric commitment is analysed in terms of two normative components: ‘accountability’ and ‘discursive responsibility’. The resulting definition of lying draws all the desired distinctions, providing an intensionally adequate analysis of the concept of lying.

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Section: Definition Of Lying S Lies Iff S Asserts That P Insincerelymentioning

confidence: 99%

Lying, speech acts, and commitment

Marsili

2020

Synthese

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“…Nonetheless, rather than abandoning their position, traditionalists about lyingthe so-called deceptionists (Mahon 2008)have come up with many innovative arguments that make the interpretation according to which Artie and other liars of his kind lie without intending to deceive much less convincing: e.g. Kenyon (2003Kenyon ( , 2010, Staffel (2011, forthcoming), Meibauer (2011Meibauer ( , 2014aMeibauer ( , 2014bMeibauer ( , 2016aMeibauer ( , 2016b, Lackey (2013), Tollefsen (2014), Dynel (2015), Leland (2015), and Keiser (2016). And with some replies from Fallis (2015), Stokke (2017), and Krstić (2017), this debate has become very interesting.…”

Section: Lying and Deceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 By positing that Pinocchio willingly lied, I avoid the objection that coerced lies are not lies (Kenyon 2003(Kenyon , 2010Leland 2015). 4 Lackey's 'marathon' analogy could be turned against her.…”

Section: You Can Lie Without Intending To Deceivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Artie's lie is also a coercion‐lie on account of Artie being forced to say that he saw nothing: Artie lies to the police because he is afraid of Tony, not because he wants to deceive them (Sorensen ; Fallis ; Lackey ; Leland ). Finally, according to Sorensen (), a knowledge‐lie is a statement intended to block knowledge that the very statement is false but which is not meant to convince the hearer that it is true.…”

Section: Lying and Deceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By positing that Pinocchio willingly lied, I avoid the objection that coerced lies are not lies (Kenyon , ; Leland ).…”

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Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?

Krstic

2018

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible.

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Meibauer¹

2018

Handbuch Pragmatik

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Rational responsibility and the assertoric character of bald-faced lies

Cited by 8 publications

References 9 publications

Lying, speech acts, and commitment

Lying, speech acts, and commitment

Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?

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