Rational Proofs against Rational Verifiers

Inasawa, Keita; Yasunaga, Kenji

doi:10.1587/transfun.e100.a.2392

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Chen et al [18] consider rational proofs where the rational provers are noncooperative [18]. Inasawa and Kenji [36] consider rational proofs where the verifier is also rational and wants to minimize the payment to the provers.…”

Section: Additional Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient Rational Proofs with Strong Utility-Gap Guarantees

Chen

McCauley

Singh

2018

Algorithmic Game Theory

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As modern computing moves towards smaller devices and powerful cloud platforms, more and more computation is being delegated to powerful service providers. Interactive proofs are a widely-used model to design efficient protocols for verifiable computation delegation. Rational proofs are payment-based interactive proofs. The payments are designed to incentivize the provers to give correct answers. If the provers misreport the answer then they incur a payment loss of at least 1/u, where u is the utility gap of the protocol. In this work, we tightly characterize the power of rational proofs that are super efficient, that is, require only logarithmic time and communication for verification. We also characterize the power of single-round rational protocols that require only logarithmic space and randomness for verification. Our protocols have strong (that is, polynomial, logarithmic, and even constant) utility gap. Finally, we show when and how rational protocols can be converted to give the completeness and soundness guarantees of classical interactive proofs. service providers (or provers) to determine the correctness of their claim. At the end, the verifier probabilistically accepts or rejects the claim. 3 Interactive proofs guarantee that, roughly speaking, the verifier accepts a truthful claim with probability at least 2/3 (completeness) and no strategy of the provers can make the verifier accept a false claim with probability more than 1/3 (soundness). 4 .Rational proofs are payment-based interactive proofs for computation outsourcing which leverage the incentives of the service providers. In rational proofs, the provers act rationally in the game-theoretic sense, that is, they want to maximize their payment. The payment is designed such that when the provers maximize their payment, they also end up giving the correct answer. The model of rational proofs (RIP) was introduced by Azar and Micali in [3]. Since then, many simple and efficient rational protocols have been designed [4, 11, 17, 30, 31, 35, 48].While rational proofs provide strong theoretical guarantees, there are two main barriers that separate them from what is often desired in practice. First, many rational protocols require a polynomial-time verifier-but a "weak" client is unlikely to be able to spend (say) quadratic time or linear extra space on verification. Second, many of these protocols strongly rely on the rationality of the provers. An honest prover may receive only a fraction of a cent more than a dishonest prover, yet a rational prover is assumed to be incentivized by that small amount. However, service providers may not always be perfectly rational.The goal of this paper is to give protocols that overcome these barriers.Utility Gap. The strength of the guarantee provided by rational proofs is captured by the notion of utility gap. The high level idea behind utility gap is that provers who are not perfectly rational may not care about small losses in payments and may lazily give the incorrect answer. If a rational protocol has a utility gap...

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Section: Additional Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient Rational Proofs with Strong Utility-Gap Guarantees

Chen

McCauley

Singh

2018

Algorithmic Game Theory

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“…There are many studies using game-theoretic analysis for cryptographic primitives, including secret sharing [10]- [19], two-party protocols [20]- [22], public-key encryption [9], leader election [23], [24], Byzantine agreement [25], delegation of computation [26]- [30], and protocol design [31], [32]. Among them, repeated games have been introduced only in rational secret sharing [33].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Repeated Games for Generating Randomness in Encryption

Yasunaga

Yuzawa

2018

IEICE Trans. Fundamentals

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In encryption schemes, the sender may not generate randomness properly if generating randomness is costly, and the sender is not concerned about the security of a message. The problem was studied by the first author (2016), and was formalized in a game-theoretic framework. In this work, we construct an encryption scheme with an optimal round complexity on the basis of the mechanism of repeated games.

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“…Since then, rational secret sharing has been intensively studied [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. Moreover, there have been many studies using game-theoretic analysis of cryptographic primitives/protocols, including two-party computation [16], [17], leader election [18], [19], Byzantine agreement [20], consensus [21], public-key encryption [22], [23], delegation of computation [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], and protocol design [30], [31]. Among them, several works [20], [24], [25], [27], [30] used the rationality of adversaries to circumvent the impossibility results.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%