Rational Models, Collective Goods and Nonelectoral Political Behavior

Godwin, Kenneth; Mitchell, Robert Cameron

doi:10.1177/106591298203500202

Cited by 12 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…If the individual believes that group unity is necessary for success, then the individual expected value of collective action is conditional on the behavior of the other group members. It is clear that perceptions of group efficacy are an important empirical predictor in tests of the CI model, and also rational models of public participation (Godwin and Mitchell 1982).…”

Section: Applying the Collective Interest Model To Air Policy Activismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective Action, Environmental Activism, and Air Quality Policy

Lubell

Vedlitz

Zahran

et al. 2006

Political Research Quarterly

113

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This article attempts to respond to Ostrom’s call for a behavioral model of collective action by generalizing the collective interest model of mass political action to explain citizen policy support and personal behavioral intentions in the context of air quality policy. The collective action problems inherent in air quality policy provide a critical research setting for testing hypotheses of the collective interest model. Key elements of the collective interest model—perceived risk, trust in policy elites, knowledge of the policy problem, and efficacy—are found to be directly, and positively, related to support of government policies and intentions to engage in personal behaviors that might improve air quality. The article discusses the implications for using the collective interest model as general behavioral theory of collective action.

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Section: Applying the Collective Interest Model To Air Policy Activismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective Action, Environmental Activism, and Air Quality Policy

Lubell

Vedlitz

Zahran

et al. 2006

Political Research Quarterly

113

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…But unconditional Kantianism is unlikely in collective action situations; unless the action potentially can succeed, moral edicts to participate will have little practical force (Elster 1985;Hardin 1982, 118-22). The individual is more likely to be a "calculating Kantian," who "will do as he would have others do so long as there are enough others who do likewise to produce net benefits for him, but he will not adamantly contribute to a lost cause" (Hardin 1982, 118; see also Godwin and Mitchell 1982). In other words, the calculating Kantian is one who will "play fair" and cooperate if enough others are willing to do the same.…”

Section: Public Goods and Collective Action: Alternative Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action

1989

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We propose two models to explain why individuals participate in collective political action—a personal influence model and a collective rationality model. Each model overcomes the free-rider problem posed by conventional rational choice theory and left unresolved in previous research. The models are tested for legal and illegal protest behaviors, using data from a national sample and two samples of protest-prone communities in the Federal Republic of Germany. The personal influence model is supported for both forms of participation, while the collective rationality model is supported for legal protest. We discuss implications of the results for grievance and rational choice theories of collective political action.

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“…In contrast, Mancur Olson (1 965) argued that "rational" individuals must be induced to participate in collective action by selective material benefits and/or coercion. Subsequent studies of collective action suggested that expressive benefits and solidary benefits are also capable of inducing collective action (Marsh 1976; Tillock and Morrison Activkts, Contributors, and Volunteers 281 1979;Moe 1980;Godwin and Mitchell 1982;Rothenberg 1988). Another school of thought suggests that individuals join groups because they realize it makes sense collectively to do so Opp 1986, 1987;Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989).…”

Section: Group Joining and Activismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another set of hypotheses is related to the more traditional view of benefits (see Marsh 1987; Tillock and Morrison 1979; Moe 1980; Godwin and Mitchell 1982;Rothenberg 1988). These hypotheses are as follow: Those who value expressive benefits are more prone to activism than those who do not; those who value material benefits are more prone to activism than those who do not; and those who value solidary benefits are more prone to activism than those who do not.…”

Section: Hypotheseamentioning

confidence: 99%

Activists, Contributors, and Volunteers: The Participation Puzzle

Neeley¹,

Nownes

1998

Southeastern Political Review

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Despite a general consemus that citizen group supporters vary radically in their level of group activityo we know little about what factors "create" an activist. This paper asks: What factors determine which mode a supporter chooses?We seek to answer this question by examining socio-demographic correlates of participation and several "benefits" of participation using individual level survey data. This question informs a more central question: What factors separate the activist fiom the ''regular'' supporter? Wejind that those individuals best able to bear participation costs who also participate out of a sense of duty and who enjoy group participation most, are the most likely to opt for maximum participation. Our ahta support the conclusion that duty, commitment, andthe desire for expressive benefits are capable of overwhelming the 'pee-rider " impulse. However, activists are not typical, comprising only afiaction of group membership. This means Olson, who would predict that few people would become activists. is right for most people most of the time.

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Rational Models, Collective Goods and Nonelectoral Political Behavior

Cited by 12 publications

References 16 publications

Collective Action, Environmental Activism, and Air Quality Policy

Collective Action, Environmental Activism, and Air Quality Policy

Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action

Activists, Contributors, and Volunteers: The Participation Puzzle

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