“…2 Out of the myriad of potential candidates for patent value indicators or determinants, renewal data and patent families are probably the most widely recognized and used. 3 Indeed, they constitute two essential dimensions of a patent's life, its age and geographical scope respectively, which together reflect the efforts and costs incurred by patent owners to acquire and 1 See [LEMLEY, 2001], [VAN POTTELSBERGHE & FRANÇOIS, 2006] and [ for broad discussions on patent systems, their effectiveness and their cost to society. 2 REITZIG [2004] and SAPSALIS & provide in-depth surveys of this literature, including discussions on the variables used to measure the value, and the potential value determinants.…”
“…2 Out of the myriad of potential candidates for patent value indicators or determinants, renewal data and patent families are probably the most widely recognized and used. 3 Indeed, they constitute two essential dimensions of a patent's life, its age and geographical scope respectively, which together reflect the efforts and costs incurred by patent owners to acquire and 1 See [LEMLEY, 2001], [VAN POTTELSBERGHE & FRANÇOIS, 2006] and [ for broad discussions on patent systems, their effectiveness and their cost to society. 2 REITZIG [2004] and SAPSALIS & provide in-depth surveys of this literature, including discussions on the variables used to measure the value, and the potential value determinants.…”
“…According to Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) and Lemley (2001), most patents do not arouse litigation. In effect, only something about 0.1% of patents needs court's verdict.…”
Section: Litigation Licensing Profit Distribution and Social Welfarementioning
“…12 A few papers focus on the optimal design of these instruments by a Patent Office. Lemley (2001) argues that it is efficient to implement a low examination standard, because the costs of improving the examination process and the quality of issued patents would outweigh the cost of the mistakes currently made (the Patent Office is "rationally ignorant"). Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) and Scotchmer (1999) study the design of renewal application fees and their impact on R&D. In those articles, patent life is endogenously chosen by firms via the renewal application fee.…”
a b s t r a c tThe number of patent applications and "bad" patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years. Based on this trend, we study the overload problem within the Patent Office and its consequences on the firms' R&D incentives. We assume that the examination process of patent applications is imperfect, and that its quality is poorer under congestion. Depending on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non-obviousness requirement, the system may result in a high-R&D equilibrium, in which firms self-select in their patent applications, or in an equilibrium with low R&D, opportunistic patent applications and the issuance of bad patents. Multiple equilibria often co-exist, which deeply undermines the effectiveness of policy instruments. We investigate the robustness of our conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized, taking into consideration the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications, as well as the role of commitment to a given patent protection policy.
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