Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure

Bergmann, Michael

doi:10.3366/e1742360009000756

Cited by 46 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…To focus simply on your seeming that p is to ignore what else seems true to you (that an equally qualified individual disagrees with you on this matter), and so simply sticking with that one seeming is not the rational course of action. 21 Michael Bergmann (2009) has defended a Steadfast View of disagreement by appealing to cases where each of the parties to the disagreement has an error theory about the other party. Bergmann distinguishes between internal rationality and external rationality.…”

Section: How Things Seemmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement

Matheson

2015

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Section: How Things Seemmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement

Matheson

2015

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“…Some writers understand this terminology such that two people are peers when they are equals in epistemic virtue, or when it comes to the epistemic virtues relevant to some topic (Gutting , p. 83, cf. Bergmann , p. 336). Equality of virtue could be understood in terms of a list of paradigm virtues, e.g.…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Equality of virtue could be understood in terms of a list of paradigm virtues, e.g. ‘general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias’ (Kelly , p. 175), sincerity in seeking the truth (Bergmann , p. 336), or openmindedness, intellectual integrity, intellectual honesty, and so on (cf. Gutting, op.…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox

Boyce¹,

Hazlett

2014

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One problem in the epistemology of disagreement (Kelly 2005, Feldman 2006, Christensen 2007 concerns peer disagreement, and the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe p and disagree with an "epistemic peer" of yours (more on which notion in a moment), who believes ~p. Another (Elga 2007, pp. 486-8, Kelly 2010 concerns serial peer disagreement, and the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe p1 … pn and disagree with an "epistemic peer" of yours, who believes ~p1 … ~pn. A third, which has been articulated by Peter van Inwagen (2010, pp. 27-8) concerns multi-peer disagreement, and inquires about the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe p1 … pn and disagree with a group of "epistemic peers" of yours, who believe ~p1 … ~pn, respectively. We shall argue, however, that the problem of multi-peer disagreement is a variant on the preface paradox, and that because of this (pace van Inwagen) the problem poses no challenge to the socalled "steadfast view" in the epistemology of disagreement.We shall define some terminology ( §1), present van Inwagen's challenge to the "steadfast view" ( §2), present and diagnose the preface paradox ( §3), argue that van Inwagen's challenge relies on the same principle that generates the preface paradox ( §4), and discuss the reasonable response to multi-peer disagreement ( §5). Our aim is modest: it is to defend the "steadfast view" against one particular objection; we set aside other objections to the "steadfast view," 1 as well as positive arguments in its favor.

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“…(Goldman 1979, p. 97) Compare what Alvin Plantinga (2000) calls "external rationality": the property of resulting from a properly functioning set of cognitive mechanisms (pp. 110-3, see also Bergmann 2009 Feldman argues (2006, pp. 233-5), this is not plausible.…”

Section: )mentioning

confidence: 99%

Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement

Hazlett¹

2013

Episteme

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Most people not only think that it is possible for reasonable people to disagree, but that it is possible for people to recognize that they are parties to a reasonable disagreement. The aim of this paper is to explain how such mutually recognized reasonable disagreements are possible. I appeal to an “entitlement claim” which implies a form of relativism about reasonable belief, based on the idea that whether a belief is reasonable for a person can depend on the fact that she has inherited a particular worldview from her community.

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Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure

Cited by 46 publications

References 5 publications

The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement

The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement

Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox

Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement

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