Rational conformity behavior can promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

Niu, Zhenxi; Xu, Jiwei; Dai, Dameng; Liang, Tairan; Mao, Deming; Zhao, Dawei

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2018.04.034

Cited by 19 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Other authors proposed a model with traditional and rational conformist players, where they can follow their neighbors when their payoffs have decreased in comparison with previous steps. 26 Quan et al. studied conformity in public good games 4 and Pi et al.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution and social cost of herding mentality promote cooperation

Chica,

Rand,

Santos

2023

iScience

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution and social cost of herding mentality promote cooperation

Chica,

Rand,

Santos

2023

iScience

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Decision deviation will also occur at different rational levels. For example, the Fermi rule [ 46 ] often considers that completely rational individuals constantly adopt the best strategies to pursue maximum payoffs. However, some irrational individuals have a small possibility of selecting the worse ones.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Willingness intensity and co-evolution of decision rationality depending on aspiration enhance cooperation in the spatial public goods game

Zhu

Dai

2023

PLoS ONE

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The Fermi rule states that rational or irrational sentiment affects individual decision-making. Existing studies have assumed that individuals’ irrational sentiments and behavior willingness have fixed values and do not change with time. In reality, people’s rationality sentiment and behavior willingness may be influenced by some factors. Therefore, we propose a spatial public goods game mechanism, in which individuals’ rational sentiment is co-evolution synchronously depending on the difference between aspiration and payoff. Moreover, the intensity of their subjective willingness to change the status quo depends on the gap between aspiration and payoff. We likewise compare the combined promotion effect of the stochastic “Win-Stay-Lose-Shift” (WSLS) and random imitation (IM) rules. Simulation experiments indicate that high enhancement factors are not conducive to cooperation under the IM rules. When aspiration is small, WSLS is more conducive to promoting cooperation than IM, while increasing aspiration, and the opposite phenomenon will appear. The heterogeneous strategic update rule is beneficial to the evolution of cooperation. Lastly, we find that this mechanism performs better than the traditional case in enhancing cooperation.

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“…They suggested that some other factors (e.g. conformity [25][26][27] popularity [28][29][30][31] and reputation [32][33][34], et al) may also influence imitation behavior. Recent years, the impact of success rates on cooperation has been considered.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas

Lu,

Dai

2023

New J. Phys.

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Strategy updates play an important role in the evolution of cooperation. In traditional imitation rules, it is assumed that strategic learning is driven by payoff bias. In this study, a modified Fermi rule was proposed, in which payoff and success-rate are synthetically considered to determine players’ strategy updates. It is assumed that individuals have an immediate memory length M, and that success can be measured by using an identical aspiration level a as a benchmark. Success-rate is defined in the frequency that an individual’s payoff equals or exceeds the benchmark a within the memory length M. Numerical simulations conducted by considering the two factors in the strategy update show that cooperation can be facilitated compared to the traditional version. Using the identical aspiration level a as benchmark, the results show that there is a clear phase shift phenomenon in enhancing cooperation. This implies that different b will have an appropriate aspiration interval to achieve optimal cooperation. Moreover, only a moderate immediate memory length can facilitate cooperation. The proposed mechanism is highly robust and can provide valuable insights into the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.

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Rational conformity behavior can promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

Cited by 19 publications

References 33 publications

The evolution and social cost of herding mentality promote cooperation

The evolution and social cost of herding mentality promote cooperation

Willingness intensity and co-evolution of decision rationality depending on aspiration enhance cooperation in the spatial public goods game

Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas

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